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INTRODUCTION 
Eight months pregnant with my first child, I was recounting to a friend, 
another African American woman, the flurry of preparations leading up to 
the blessed event.  She interrupted my catalogue of necessary baby-related 
purchases to ask a burning question: “And you’re now going to take [your 
husband’s] name, right?”  In truth, her question was not a question at all, 
but rather a statement so self-evidently correct (in her view) that it was 
almost not worth asking.  “No, I’m going to continue to use my own name 
professionally and socially,” I responded.  She was silent for a moment, 
weighing her words carefully: “Don’t you worry that when you take the 
baby to school, or to the airport, or wherever, people are going to look at 
you, see that you and the baby have different surnames and assume you’re 
not married?  That you had a child out of wedlock?  That you’re a 
stereotype?” 
In the years since I had that conversation, I had not given it much 
thought.  After all, though I had made the (perhaps) unorthodox choice of 
keeping my name, I was married and my child had been born in wedlock.  
More importantly, after a series of critical Supreme Court decisions in the 
1960s and 1970s, illegitimacy appeared to have lost some of its salience as 
a legal category. 
But, as this symposium contends, illegitimacy is making a comeback.  In 
June 2011, the Family Leader, a Christian conservative group, exhorted 
presidential hopefuls to sign “The Marriage Vow—a Declaration of 
Dependence upon Marriage and Family.”1  In its zeal to strengthen 
American families, “The Marriage Vow” emphasized the importance of the 
traditional nuclear family and marital fidelity, endorsed the Defense of 
Marriage Act, and disavowed the expansion of civil marriage to same-sex 
couples.  But it also prominently identified the harms of illegitimacy—and 
more importantly, linked the proliferation of illegitimate births to African 
American families, racializing this particular threat to the traditional 
nuclear family.2 
But social conservatives bent on bolstering the traditional heterosexual 
marital family have not been the only ones to emphasize illegitimacy and 
its perceived harms.  The issue of illegitimacy has become pervasive in the 
debate over same-sex marriage, as this symposium notes.  Marriage 
traditionalists argue that marriage was intended to deal with the problem of 
                                                          
 1. THE FAMILY LEADER, THE MARRIAGE VOW—A DECLARATION OF DEPENDENCE 
UPON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, www.politico.com/pdf/PPM187_marriage.pdf. 
 2. Id. (noting that “a child born into slavery in 1860 was more likely to be raised 
by his mother and father in a two-parent household than was an African-American 
baby born after the election of [Barack Obama],” and that “over 70% of African-
American babies are born to single parents—a prime sociological indicator for poverty, 
pathology and prison”) (emphasis in original). 
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illegitimacy and irresponsible procreation, and thus, should be restricted to 
heterosexual couples.  Those who favor marriage equality argue that 
illegitimacy is an injury foisted upon same-sex couples and their families 
simply because they are ineligible for civil marriage. 
In this Essay, I consider these developments, and ask two questions: 
First, what are we to make of them?  Do these developments signal a retreat 
from those earlier Supreme Court cases that dismantled the common law 
tradition in which non-marital births were legally disadvantaged and deeply 
stigmatized?  Put differently, do they suggest a “new illegitimacy” in which 
non-marital birth status has been resurrected as a salient legal concept?  
And second, (regardless of how we answer the first question) what are the 
consequences of the marriage equality movement’s interest in illegitimacy? 
The Essay proceeds in four parts.  Part I takes up the first question: does 
the marriage equality movement’s interest in illegitimacy signal the rise of 
a “new illegitimacy?”  Here, I debunk the inherited legal progress narrative 
that claims that law abandoned the common law’s treatment of illegitimacy 
and its many legal disadvantages in favor of a more liberal legal regime in 
which those of illegitimate birth were no longer legally disfavored.  In 
doing so, I review Levy v. Louisiana3 and Glona v. American Guarantee & 
Liability Insurance Co.,4 the two Supreme Court decisions credited with 
disrupting the common law tradition disfavoring non-marital births.  
Though Levy and Glona struck down legal distinctions between marital and 
non-marital children, I argue that these cases did not render a seachange in 
our understanding of illegitimacy.  Instead, their effects were more modest, 
and indeed, can be understood as reflecting a preference for marriage and 
the marital family. 
Part II builds on these insights by discussing a line of cases decided in 
Levy and Glona’s wake.  These cases, which concern the rights of 
unmarried fathers to their children born out of wedlock, provide an 
important lens through which to consider the veracity of the inherited 
progress narrative that views Levy and Glona as liberalizing law’s 
treatment of illegitimacy.  Here, I argue that constitutional protections for 
unmarried fathers and their children have been contingent on adhering to 
norms forged in the marital family.  But more importantly, the unmarried 
fathers cases demonstrate that an animating concern surrounding law’s 
treatment of illegitimacy is not solely the vertical parent-child relationship, 
but also the horizontal sexual relationship between unmarried adults.  That 
is, in these cases, the Court’s decision to credit—or discredit—the rights 
claims of unmarried fathers is largely contingent on whether or not the 
                                                          
 3. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 4. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
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petitioner functioned in the manner of a father and husband (rather than 
just as a father).  As with Part I’s re-reading of Levy and Glona, the 
analysis of the unmarried fathers cases demonstrates that the progress 
narrative associated with illegitimacy is a fiction.  Even as law professes to 
liberalize its treatment of non-marital births, its clear preference for 
channeling sex and reproduction into the marital family (and those family 
forms that mimic marital family norms) remains indelible and intact. 
Bearing in mind that the narrative that charts the “progress” from the 
common law tradition to Levy and Glona, is less progressive than the 
conventional wisdom would allow, Parts III and IV turn to the 
contemporary debate over marriage equality.  In Part III, I lay a foundation 
for what follows by considering the racialized character of illegitimacy in 
the United States.  In Part IV, I then discuss the emergence of illegitimacy 
as a means of challenging prohibitions on same-sex marriage.  To do so, I 
trace the emergence of the illegitimacy as injury argument in marriage 
equality cases and I explain the underappreciated costs of using 
illegitimacy to bolster claims for marriage equality. 
I. A PROGRESS NARRATIVE? 
At common law, children born out of wedlock were legally disfavored—
filius nullius, the child of no one.5  Parents had no obligation to recognize 
their illegitimate offspring or to provide for their upkeep, though this was 
later amended statutorily to place the duty of care for non-marital children 
squarely on the shoulders of their unmarried mothers.6  Vestigial aspects of 
this common law tradition persisted, even on this side of the Atlantic, well 
into the twentieth century. 
But according to the inherited narrative, all of this changed in 1968 when 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American 
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.  Together, Levy and Glona have been 
understood to represent a transition from the “old” illegitimacy—the 
common law tradition that imposed serious disadvantages on non-marital 
children—to a more liberal era where the sins of the parents would not be 
visited upon the children.7  But is this inherited narrative—and its rosy 
                                                          
 5. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (1769); see also MICHAEL 
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 197 (1985) (describing how non-marital children 
were considered filius nullius and therefore did not have the same right of support as 
children born in a marriage). 
 6. Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 81-82 (2003); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights are 
Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 
1669, 1683-84 (2000). 
 7. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (“[T]here is no constitutionally 
sufficient justification for denying [child support to] a child simply because its natural 
father has not married its mother.  For a State to do so is ‘illogical and unjust.’”); 
4
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portrait of legal progress—correct? 
This Part challenges this interpretation of Levy and Glona and the legal 
progress narrative that it underwrites.  To do so, this Part considers afresh 
the facts and holdings of both cases, and offers an alternative reading that 
debunks the conventional progress narrative.8 
A.  The Tragedy of Illegitimacy—The Facts of Levy and Glona 
Levy’s path to the Supreme Court began on March 29, 1964, when 
Louise Levy, a single, African American mother of five minor children, 
died at the Charity Hospital in New Orleans due to the negligence of the 
attending physician.9  In Glona, Minnie Brade Glona’s son was killed in an 
automobile accident in Louisiana.10  In both cases, the surviving family 
members sought to file a wrongful death suit under article 2315 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code.  They were precluded from doing so because, 
according to the lower courts, they were not included in the statutory 
definition of “survivors.”11  In both cases, exclusion from the statute’s 
terms turned on a single fact—illegitimacy.  Louise Levy’s five minor 
children—all of whom were essentially orphaned upon her death—had 
been born outside of marriage.  Similarly, Minnie Brade Glona’s dead son, 
Billy, was of illegitimate birth. 
In the lower courts, Louisiana successfully defended the wrongful death 
scheme on the ground that it furthered the state’s interest in promoting 
morals and the general welfare, and discouraging out-of-wedlock births.12  
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, disagreed.  In Levy, the Court 
emphasized that the right to recover under the wrongful death statute 
“involve[d] the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own 
                                                          
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“[I]mposing disabilities on 
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  Obviously, 
no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an 
ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”); Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (“We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not 
‘nonpersons.’  They are humans, live, and have their being.  They are clearly ‘persons’ 
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 8. This process of re-reading cases against their popular interpretation and 
meaning should be understood as a distinct analytical method.  See Kendall Thomas, 
Rouge Et Noir Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the Angelo Herndon Case, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2599, 2607-10 (1992) (providing a rationale for re-reading 
seemingly settled legal texts). 
 9. Brief for Appellant at 5, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508), 1967 
WL 113865, at *5. 
 10. 391 U.S. at 73. 
 11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (Supp. 1967). 
 12. Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (upholding the 
challenged statute). 
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mother.”13  Though illegitimate, the Levy children were dependent on their 
mother, who had cared for them and nurtured them throughout their lives.  
“[I]n her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent 
would,”14 and they were entitled to seek recovery for their loss, regardless 
of the circumstances of their births.  The distinction drawn by the Louisiana 
courts in interpreting the provisions of article 2315 smacked of 
“invidious”15 discrimination, as there was “no action, conduct, or demeanor 
of [the Levy children]” that was “possibly relevant to the harm that was 
done their mother.” 16 
In Glona, whose facts differed from Levy’s in that a parent was seeking 
recovery for a child’s wrongful death,17 the Court did not dispute the state’s 
purported interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of civil society, 
nor did it challenge the state’s discretion to legislate in the area of non-
marital sexual conduct18—an authority the Court recently had affirmed in 
McLaughlin v. Florida.19  Instead, in determining that the statute failed to 
pass constitutional muster, the Court focused on Louisiana’s incoherent and 
inconsistent approach to the question of illegitimacy and the regulation of 
out-of-wedlock births.20  Such incoherence, the Court concluded, revealed 
the state’s selective approach to the regulation of “sin”21—an approach that 
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it bore “no possible rational 
basis” to the state’s purported interest in furthering marriage and 
                                                          
 13. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. 
 14. Id. at 72. 
 15. Id. at 71. 
 16. Id. at 72. 
 17. The factual differences between Glona and Levy are important, as Glona 
squarely confronted the issue of the legal regulation of adult sexuality outside of 
marriage unmitigated by the question of surviving dependent children.  Indeed, in its 
briefs in Glona, Louisiana emphasized the legislation’s role in channeling adult 
sexuality into marriage:  
“Certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in 
the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than that which seeks 
to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and 
springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy state 
of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our 
civilization.” 
Brief on Behalf of Respondents at 15, Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 
73 (1968) (No. 639), 1968 WL 112853, at *15 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 
15 (1885)). 
 18. Glona, 391 U.S. at 75. 
 19. 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964) (striking down an anti-fornication statute as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause without questioning the state’s authority to 
enact laws regulating sexual conduct). 
 20. Glona, 391 U.S. at 74-75 (observing that the state “follow[ed] a curious course 
in its sanctions against illegitimacy,” and cataloging the inconsistent treatment of non-
marital children and their parents throughout the state’s legal regime). 
 21. Id. at 75. 
6
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discouraging non-marital births.22 
B.  An Alternative Narrative—Levy and Glona Revisited 
Levy and Glona have been credited as a departure from the common law 
tradition disadvantaging non-marital children.  Indeed, the cases and their 
progeny have stood for the proposition that, for most purposes, law may 
not punish innocent children for the sins of their parents.23  But Levy and 
Glona should not be seen as orchestrating a massive change in the law’s 
regard for non-marital births.  Indeed, even as Levy and Glona offered 
tentative protection for illegitimate children and their parents, neither case 
dislodged the view that the marital family was—and should be—favored 
and encouraged as a matter of public policy.  And though they debunked 
stereotypes about illegitimacy, these cases did not validate the decision to 
have sex and bear a child outside of marriage. 
This aspect of Levy and Glona becomes more visible when one considers 
the traditional account of illegitimacy and its consequences.  Under the 
traditional account, having a child out of wedlock is not just an illicit act by 
itself; it is a testament to the illicit act (or acts) that preceded it.24  
Moreover, the traditional account of illegitimacy imagines a life where 
non-marital children have little contact with their fathers, who, absent 
marriage, have few ties to the household and do little to contribute to its 
financial support.25  Instead, mothers are assumed to have primary 
responsibility for non-marital children,26 and, it is expected, will lack the 
resources to provide for the care and upkeep of these children.27  For these 
                                                          
 22. Id. 
 23. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 
529, 536 (2008). 
 24. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination 
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 371 (2010) [hereinafter 
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm] (noting that the stigma of illegitimacy flows in part 
from disapproval of the parents’ sexual behavior). 
 25. See BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL 
REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING 130-32 (2007) (discussing intuitions regarding 
unmarried fathers).  This view is undoubtedly linked to the common law’s treatment of 
paternal responsibility for illegitimate children.  At common law, a putative father had 
no legal duty to support his “natural” child unless he adopted or otherwise legitimated 
the child as his own.  2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *215; see 
also Glidden v. Nelson, 15 Ill. App. 297, 300 (1884) (acknowledging that, absent 
statutory departures from the common law, the father of an illegitimate child had no 
legal duty of support); State v. Tieman, 73 P. 375, 376 (Wash. 1903) (noting that at 
common law, absent a statute imposing a duty, putative fathers bore no obligation of 
support for their illegitimate children). 
 26. See 2 KENT, supra note 25, at *215 (“[The mother] has a right to the custody 
and control of [the non-marital child] as against the putative father, and is bound to 
maintain [the child] as its natural guardian . . . .”). 
 27. See Amy L. Wax, Op-Ed., The Failure of Welfare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2006, at 2 (“[T]he mother-child family is not, and will never be, a viable economic 
7
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reasons, illegitimacy often is imagined as engendering an unhealthy, but 
inevitable, dependence on the public fisc28—a dependence that is wholly at 
odds with the norms of financial independence that the marital family is 
believed to cultivate.29 
And perhaps most troublingly, it is argued that children reared outside of 
the marital family have few examples of a moral, virtuous adult life.  
Instead, non-marital children are believed to be raised with the view that 
dependence on public assistance, and sex and parenthood outside of 
marriage are acceptable, if not unavoidable.30  As a result, the traditional 
account of illegitimacy posits a never-ending cycle in which children 
become heirs to their parents’ immorality and lax values. 
Critically, this traditional account of illegitimacy was largely absent in 
the Court’s depiction of the plaintiffs in Levy and Glona.  Consider Levy, 
whose facts often have led to the conclusion that the Court’s decision was, 
in part, an attempt to ensure that the sins of the parents were not visited 
upon innocent children.31  This is certainly a valid reading of Levy, as the 
Court was particularly attuned to the basic unfairness of discriminating 
                                                          
unit.  A single parent must play two roles—caring for children and earning a living—
that wives and husbands traditionally assumed together.  As a result, most such families 
end up poor.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s 
Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1651-
52 (2005) (discussing the 1996 welfare reforms and the attendant effort to promote 
marriage and reduce out-of-wedlock births in order to limit dependence on public 
assistance); Press Release, White House, Working Toward Independence, (Feb. 26, 
2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book-all.html (noting “the historic increase in 
non-marital births that have contributed so heavily to the Nation’s domestic problems 
including poverty, violence, and intergenerational welfare dependency”). 
 29. See Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46 
(2012) [hereinafter Murray, Marriage as Punishment] (discussing the marital norm of 
financial independence from the state).  It is worth noting that, as part of the effort to 
end welfare, the federal government paid states “illegitimacy bonuses” in an effort to 
reduce illegitimacy, and concomitantly, intergenerational dependence on public 
assistance.  See Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, § 403(a)(2)(c)(i)(I), 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603). 
 30. See Charles Murray, Op-Ed., The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
29, 1993, at A14 [hereinafter Murray, The Coming White Underclass].  In 1995, 
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison credited this logic, describing the American welfare 
system as “a self-perpetuating monster that sustains the most distressing ills of our 
society—illegitimacy, the disintegration of the family, weakening of the work ethic, 
and crippling dependency.”  See Holloway Sparks, Queens, Teens, and Model Mothers: 
Race, Gender, and the Discourse of Welfare Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF 
WELFARE REFORM 171, 182 (Sanford S. Schram et al. eds., 2003) (quoting Senator 
Hutchison). 
 31. See Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance Rights 
of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125, 158 (2005) 
(citing Levy as exemplary of the Court’s “impatience with statutes that punish innocent 
children for the wrongdoing of their parents”). 
8
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against a child based on no “action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs.”32  But 
curiously, though the Levy decision vindicated the rights of Louise Levy’s 
children to bring a wrongful death claim, the Court—and the briefs 
supporting the children’s claim—spent a good deal of time recounting 
Louise Levy’s conduct as a mother. 
Though Louise Levy’s maternal conduct arguably had little relevance to 
the merits of her children’s underlying equal protection claim, the Court 
noted that she “treated [her five non-marital children] as a parent would 
treat any other child”33—including children born and raised within 
marriage.  The five children lived with Levy, and she—and she alone—
supported them through her work as a domestic servant, without resort to 
the public fisc.34  Perhaps most impressive to the Court (and to the 
children’s lawyers, who mentioned it repeatedly in their briefs) was the fact 
that Louise Levy took all five children to church “every Sunday and 
enroll[ed] them, at her own expense, in parochial school,” rather than 
relying on public school for their education.35  The Court’s emphasis of 
these facts presents an implicit message—regardless of their mother’s 
sexual history, the Levy children were no ordinary bastards, at least as far 
as the traditional account of illegitimacy was concerned.  They were not 
reliant on the public fisc,36 and their mother emphasized strong moral and 
religious values. 
Critically, the Court did not speculate about Louise Levy’s own sexual 
practices—we are never told whether her children were fathered by the 
same man or by different men, nor do we know about her intimate life at 
                                                          
 32. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). 
 33. Id. at 70 (emphasis added). 
 34. See id. at 72.  In this way, Levy was fulfilling both a maternal and a paternal 
role in her family.  Moreover, unless she was an unusually well paid domestic worker, 
she was likely relying on help from extended family and friends to care for her 
children.  See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal 
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (2008), 
[hereinafter Murray, The Networked Family] (discussing the reliance on caregiving 
networks in economically challenged families). 
 35. 391 U.S. at 70. 
 36. See Murray, Marriage as Punishment, supra note 29, at 45 (discussing marital 
norms of financial independence).  The connection between marriage and financial 
independence from the state is not a new phenomenon.  See Laura F. Edwards, “The 
Marriage Covenant Is at the Foundation of all Our Rights”: The Politics of Slave 
Marriages in North Carolina After Emancipation, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 81, 92 (1996) 
(noting that the post-bellum emphasis on marriage “was inextricably tied to other 
issues, the most prominent of which was the fear that freedpeople would not support 
themselves economically”); Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1541, 1549 (2001) (describing the Reconstruction Era project of assimilating newly 
freed African Americans into the norms of the marital family—a project that “was 
motivated, in significant part, by a desire to privatize dependency”); Ariela R. Dubler, 
Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth 
Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886-87 (1998) (discussing the recognition of common-
law marriage as a means of privatizing the dependency of women and children). 
9
Murray: What's So New about the New Illegitimacy
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
396 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
the time of her death.  Instead, the Court focused on other, seemingly 
irrelevant, details of Levy’s life, such as her insistence on regular church 
attendance and parochial school education.37  The emphasis on these 
apparently trivial details might gesture towards a number of things.  On the 
one hand, it could suggest that the Court inferred from Levy’s religious life 
that she was celibate (or at least monogamous), devoting herself entirely to 
her children’s care and upkeep.  It could also mean that the Court inferred 
from these facts that the Levy children were unlikely to succumb to the 
cycle of illegitimacy and immorality.  Though born outside of marriage, 
their strong religious foundations suggested that they were equipped to 
pursue disciplined, moral lives, rather than buckle under the cycle of 
poverty, dependence, and immorality with which illegitimacy was 
associated.38 
Unlike Levy, Glona squarely confronted the question of a parent’s sin, 
rather than the more sympathetic facts of a child being punished for his 
parents’ prior behavior.  Despite this difference, the Court nevertheless 
suggested that the facts of Glona were distinguishable from the standard 
account of illegitimacy. 
Though Minnie Brade Glona conceded giving birth to a non-marital 
child in her youth, she was now a married woman who, with her husband, 
had “informally recognized” her illegitimate son throughout the boy’s 
life.39  Glona’s marital status complicated the elaborate regime of sexual 
regulation that the state attempted to justify in its brief before the Court.  In 
an effort to counter the claim that Louisiana “engaged in purely prejudicial 
practices against illegitimates,”40 the respondents detailed the many 
procedures by which Louisiana permitted the legitimation of children born 
outside of marriage.41  These procedures, the respondents averred, allowed 
the state to balance its interest in affirming that “legitimate relations form 
the basis of civilized society,” while also providing parents some latitude to 
legitimate their illegitimate children.42  Not surprisingly, many of the 
                                                          
 37. See 391 U.S. at 70. 
 38. See MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM 
RHETORIC TO REFORM 80 (1994) (noting the view that when “children [are] raised in 
homes where welfare is a primary source of income, [they will] find welfare, out-of-
wedlock births, and lack of work a normal and largely acceptable fact of life”); Tonya 
Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 236 (2000) 
(discussing the intergenerational theory of welfare dependency, which posits that the 
“negative traits” associated with welfare dependency, including a greater acceptance of 
out-of-wedlock births, are passed on to successive generations, becoming “a way of life 
for some families”). 
 39. See Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 40. Brief on Behalf of Respondents, supra note 17, at *10. 
 41. See id. at *9. 
 42. See id. at *10-11. 
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means for doing so involved the mother of the child “entering into a 
marriage with the father of the child and . . . formally or informally 
acknowledging the child” as a child of the marriage.43 
Louisiana recognized that what had been illegitimate could be cured and 
made legitimate with marriage.44  As a married woman,45 Minnie Brade 
Glona had in spirit, if not in fact, lived within the bounds of “legitimate 
relations.”46  Though she had not married the father of her illegitimate son, 
and had not taken formal steps to have the child legitimated through an 
adoption by her and her husband, she had married and raised her son within 
the structure of the marital family.47  In doing so, she provided her son with 
a living example of how to live a respectable adult life, and importantly, 
she, like Louise Levy, appeared to defy the established script for unmarried 
mothers. 
I raise these facts to suggest that the Court may have understood the 
circumstances of Levy and Glona to be a departure from the standard 
account of illegitimacy, and therefore worthy of constitutional protection.48  
The petitioners in Levy and Glona succeeded not because the Court was 
keen to remove all distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate births,49 
but because it was crediting the degree to which Louise Levy and Minnie 
Brade Glona (and their families) were, despite their illegitimate pasts, 
comporting with marital family norms. 
More importantly, we might read the Court’s emphasis of certain facts in 
its disposition of these cases as having a thicker normative dimension.  
                                                          
 43. Id. at *10. 
 44. See Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit 
Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 776-77 (2006) (discussing marriage’s ability to “cure” illicit 
sex). 
 45. The Court was certainly aware of Glona’s marital status, as it was referenced in 
the litigants’ briefs submitted to the Court.  In their brief, Glona’s lawyers referred to 
her as “Mrs. Minnie Brade Glona.”  See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, Glona v. 
Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (No. 639), 1968 WL 112852 
(emphasis added).  The respondents’ brief named Glona’s husband, identifying her as a 
married woman.  See Brief on Behalf of Respondents, supra note 17, at *10. 
 46. Brief on Behalf of Respondents, supra note 17, at *10. 
 47. Meaningfully, Glona’s deceased son was known as “Billy Glona,” suggesting 
that he had assumed his stepfather’s name, and though he had never been formally 
legitimated by his mother and her husband, that he was regarded as a member of their 
marital family.  See Illegitimacy, THE FREE LANCE-STAR (Fredericksburg, Va.), May 
21, 1968, at 19 (referring to Glona’s son as “Billy Glona”). 
 48. Indeed, as Serena Mayeri has noted, Glona and the Levy children were 
specifically selected to front the litigation, suggesting that the advocates bringing the 
case were well aware of the way that the facts of each case departed from the 
traditional account of illegitimacy. See Serena Mayeri, What’s Wrong With 
Illegitimacy?: A Brief History (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 49. And indeed, the facts of Glona, which pitted an adult’s sexual past against the 
state’s interest in regulating sex and morality, belie such a facile reading.  See Glona v. 
Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968). 
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Recall the 2003 case, Lawrence v. Texas,50 in which the Court invalidated a 
Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy.  There, the majority opinion 
depicted the two petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, as 
though they were a long-term couple living a life in common.51  In fact, 
Lawrence and Garner were not a couple at the time of the arrest.52  
Although it is possible that Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the Lawrence 
majority, was unaware of the precise details of the facts, some have 
suggested that his depiction of Lawrence and Garner as a couple was 
intended to establish this type of monogamous, coupled intimacy as the 
norm for same-sex sexuality.53 
Levy and Glona might be read along similar lines.  In focusing on Louise 
Levy’s financial independence and strong religious ethic, and Louisiana’s 
procedures for legitimating non-marital children, which Minnie Brade 
Glona had complied with in spirit, though not in fact, perhaps the Court 
was attempting to establish a norm for the types of illegitimate families it 
would credit and protect.  Constitutional protection is available to those 
who behave like Louise Levy and Minnie Brade Glona—women who, 
despite their earlier missteps, rehabilitated themselves and comported with 
many of the norms of respectability and discipline associated with the 
marital family.  Protection for those who fail to observe these norms, and 
instead behave in the manner typically associated with unwed mothers, is 
less certain.54 
                                                          
 50. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 51. See id. at 567 (noting that the couple was engaging in anal sex in furtherance of  
“a personal bond that is more enduring”). 
 52. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 1464, 1478 (2004) (“Lawrence and Garner may have been occasional sexual 
partners, but were not in a long-term, committed relationship when they were 
arrested.”); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2004) [hereinafter Franke, Domesticated Liberty] (noting 
that neither the facts of the case nor the briefs offered anything that would suggest that 
Lawrence and Garner were in a long-term relationship); Melissa Murray, Strange 
Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1305 (2008) (“Although there was scant evidence for it, 
Kennedy’s opinion speaks of Lawrence and Garner as though they are long-term 
partners sharing a life in common.”). 
 53. See Teemu Ruskola, What’s Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 SOC. 
TEXT 235, 241 (arguing that the Lawrence Court announced an archetype for legitimate 
same-sex sex and relationships). 
 54. This has been borne out in other cases concerning illegitimacy.  See Lalli v. 
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (denying the claim of an illegitimate child to his father’s 
estate where father had a legitimate, marital family that stood to inherit); Labine v. 
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (denying intestacy claim of illegitimate child whose 
parents did not evince nuclear family norms); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) 
(same); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (crediting illegitimate 
children’s claim to workman’s compensation in circumstance where parents, though 
unmarried, lived together and raised their children).  This also has been present in cases 
concerning the rights of unmarried fathers.  See infra pp. 400-11.  This is not to say that 
adherence to marital family norms is the sole factor in the disposition of these cases.  
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Re-read in this way, Levy and Glona do not necessarily support a 
progress narrative that heralds the liberalization of sexual mores and a 
categorical acceptance of illegitimacy.  If anything, we might interpret 
these cases as eliminating some of the burdens of illegitimacy while 
maintaining a pro-marriage, pro-marital-family impulse.55 
Critically, Levy and Glona are not the only cases from this time period 
that venerate marriage and the marital family over other alternatives.  As 
the following Part discusses, the Court’s jurisprudence on the rights of 
unmarried fathers also involves the question of illegitimacy and the 
normative preference for the marital family, and in so doing, challenges the 
inherited progress narrative associated with illegitimacy.  
II.  ILLEGITIMACY REDUX—THE UNMARRIED FATHERS CASES 
In 1972, just four years after Levy and Glona, the Supreme Court 
announced the first decision in a line of cases focused on the parental rights 
of unmarried fathers.56  Because these cases did not implicate a claim for 
some sort of posthumously conferred benefit, as Levy and Glona had, their 
focus on the legal recognition of an unmarried father’s parental rights 
appeared not to involve the thornier question of whether such recognition 
implicitly endorsed illegitimacy and out-of-wedlock sex.  Accordingly, this 
line of cases is not often discussed in tandem with the Levy and Glona line 
of cases, which confronts squarely the degree to which the state may 
legally disadvantage illegitimate birth.57 
Yet, despite these differences, the unmarried fathers cases share 
important commonalities with Levy, Glona, and their progeny.  In both 
lines of cases, the indeterminate legal status of the petitioners’ claims 
stemmed from the parties’ location outside of marriage.  In Levy and 
                                                          
Indeed, the outcomes also are influenced by the context in which the cases arise—the 
Court often credits intestacy laws distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate 
children, as was the case in Lalli and Trimble, but seems less willing to credit these 
distinctions in cases involving financial support of a child, as was the case in Gomez v. 
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 55. As Serena Mayeri notes, the architects of the legal challenge to the illegitimacy 
distinction focused on the harm to children, and consciously avoided challenging 
marriage’s privileged position as the approved site of sexual expression and laws 
regulating adult sexuality more generally.  See Mayeri, supra note 48. 
 56. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 57. The exception to this may be Stanley, which is often cited in tandem with Levy 
and Glona for the proposition that legal disadvantages associated with illegitimacy 
have been removed.  See Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: 
Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and 
Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 604 n. 561 (2001) (citing Levy and Stanley).  But 
see Robert E. Rhodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643, 684 
(2001) (noting that while distinctions between marital and non-marital children were 
deemed constitutionally suspect in Levy, cases like Stanley “indicated that [the 
distinction] was not to be entirely abandoned”). 
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Glona, the inability to bring a wrongful death claim was linked to a non-
marital birth.  Similarly, in the unmarried fathers cases, the question of the 
scope and nature of paternal rights was in doubt solely because paternity 
occurred outside of marriage. 
This Part considers the unmarried fathers cases and identifies important 
linkages between this jurisprudential line and Levy, Glona, and their 
progeny.  Specifically, this Part argues that these cases build on Levy and 
Glona’s uneven legacy by rendering even more visible the Court’s 
preference for marriage and the marital family over other alternatives.  
More importantly, these cases make clear what the illegitimacy progress 
narrative often occludes: that law’s concern with illegitimacy is as much 
about the horizontal relationship between two adults who choose to live 
their intimate lives outside of marriage, as it is about the vertical 
relationship between a parent and a child born outside of marriage. 
A.  Crediting the Rights of Unmarried Fathers 
1.  Stanley v. Illinois 
In 1972’s Stanley v. Illinois,58 the Court began tentatively to sketch the 
contours of constitutional protections for the paternal rights of unmarried 
fathers.  For eighteen years, Peter Stanley and his long-term partner, Joan, 
lived together intermittently and raised three children.59  When Joan 
Stanley died, Peter lost not only his life partner, but custody of their minor 
children as well.60  Pursuant to Illinois law, the children of unmarried 
fathers became wards of the state upon the death of their mother.61  Peter 
challenged the removal of his children from his custody, claiming that he 
had never been declared an unfit parent, and that the Illinois law 
impermissibly distinguished between married and unmarried fathers and 
unmarried fathers and mothers, in violation of his equal protection rights.62 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed.  Relying on a series of due 
process cases articulating a parent’s right to control the rearing of her 
children, the Court observed that “[t]he private interest . . . of a man in the 
children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent 
a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”63  Further, the Court, citing 
Levy, observed that law did not “refuse[] to recognize those family 
                                                          
 58. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 59. Id. at 646. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 651. 
14
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/2
  
2012] MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND ILLEGITIMACY 401 
relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.”64  Reasoning that the 
bonds between “natural, but illegitimate, children” and their parents “were 
often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more 
formally organized family unit,”65 the Court saw no reason to draw 
distinctions between the rights of married and unmarried fathers.  Though 
the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of vulnerable children was 
admirable indeed, it did not require the blanket presumption that all 
unmarried fathers were “unsuitable and neglectful parents.”66 
Peter Stanley’s Supreme Court victory has been held out as further 
evidence of the dismantling of legal distinctions concerning illegitimacy in 
the 1960s and 1970s.67  Such a claim, though facially accurate, misses the 
mark.  In concluding that Peter Stanley’s rights had been violated, the 
Court emphasized Stanley’s conduct within his family unit.  Stanley, the 
Court noted approvingly, was not the sort of negligent, unmarried father 
contemplated by the Illinois statute.68  Like Louise Levy and Minnie Brade 
Glona, Peter Stanley’s conduct departed from the traditional account of 
illegitimacy, which imagined the unmarried father as an unreliable, 
unsupportive, and disinterested presence in the lives of his children.69  
Instead, Peter Stanley was a strong presence in his children’s lives, living 
with them and supporting them financially for many years. 
But importantly, the Court’s decision in his favor was not solely 
predicated on Stanley’s conduct vis-à-vis his children; the Court also 
emphasized the nature of Stanley’s conduct with regard to Joan, the mother 
of his children.  Though they were not married, for most of their eighteen 
years together, Peter and Joan Stanley had lived together, shared the 
family’s economic burdens, and co-parented their children together.70  
                                                          
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 651-52. 
 66. Id. at 654. 
 67. See Storrow, supra note 57, at 604 n. 561 (citing Levy and Stanley as evidence 
that the law recognizes familial relationships outside of marriage).  But see Rhodes, 
supra note 57, at 684 (claiming that although Levy deemed differences between marital 
and non-marital children constitutionally suspect, cases like Stanley suggest that the 
distinction was not completely deserted). 
 68. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 655 (“[N]othing in this record indicates that Stanley is or 
has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children.”). 
 69. See COSSMAN, supra note 25, at 130-32 (discussing the standard account of 
unmarried fathers); Harry D. Krause, Reflections on Child Support, 1983 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 99, 111-12 (1983) (discussing “‘matriarchal subculture’ theories” that emphasize 
the failure of unmarried fathers to provide economically for their children); Solangel 
Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1007-08 (2006) (noting the perception that unmarried fathers 
fail to provide financial support to their children). 
 70. Indeed, the briefs filed in support of Stanley referred to Joan as his “common-
law wife.” See Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 
(No. 70-5014), 1971 WL 134140, at *7. 
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Peter had not only behaved like a father; he had behaved like a husband.71  
From this perspective, Stanley is utterly consistent with Levy and Glona—
but not because it signals broad protections for those who choose to live 
outside of marriage and their children.  Instead, Stanley, like Levy and 
Glona, is oddly schizophrenic in that its nominal protection for non-marital 
families is embedded in its implicit veneration of marital family norms. 
For some, this reading of Stanley may seem discordant.  However, if one 
delves further into the line of unmarried fathers cases, this aspect of Stanley 
becomes even more apparent.  From 1978 to 1983, the Court revisited the 
basic question posed in Stanley v. Illinois—what was the nature and scope 
of an unmarried father’s parental rights?  In these cases, Quilloin v. 
Walcott,72 Lehr v. Robertson,73 Caban v. Mohammed,74 and Michael H. v. 
Gerald D.,75 the Court elaborated the extent of the Constitution’s 
protections for the rights of unmarried fathers, and in so doing, underscored 
a clear preference for marriage over non-marriage, and for the marital 
family over other alternatives. 
2.  Quilloin v. Walcott and Lehr v. Robertson 
In both Quilloin and Lehr, the Court rejected petitions for paternal rights 
lodged by two unmarried biological fathers.  The facts of the cases were 
similar: an unmarried father sought to block the adoption of his biological 
child by the child’s new stepfather.76  From the start, the Court’s account of 
the factual circumstances made clear that Leon Webster Quilloin and 
Jonathan Lehr were not in the same position as Peter Stanley.  As the Court 
recounted, Quilloin and his son’s mother, Ardell Williams Walcott, “never 
married each other or established a home together.”77  In the eleven years 
between the child’s birth and the filing of the adoption petition, Quilloin 
made no effort to legitimate the boy, despite the fact that Georgia provided 
statutory procedures for doing so.78  Although Quilloin and his son had 
visited “on many occasions,”79 and Quilloin had provided the child with 
                                                          
 71. See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE 
L.J. 1236, 1253 (2010). 
 72. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 73. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 74. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 75. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 76. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. 
 77. 434 U.S. at 247. 
 78. Id. at 249 (“Appellant did not petition for legitimation of his child at any time 
during the [eleven] years between the child’s birth and the filing of [the] adoption 
petition.”). 
 79. Id. at 251 (internal punctuation omitted). 
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“toys and gifts . . . from time to time,”80 he had provided financial support 
“only on an irregular basis.”81 
Similarly, the Court concluded that the differences between Lehr and 
Stanley were “clear and significant.”82  In stark contrast to Stanley, 
Jonathan Lehr’s relationship with his two-year-old daughter was 
“inchoate.”83  According to the majority, Lehr’s name did not “appear on 
[his daughter’s] birth certificate,” and he “did not live with [mother and 
child] after [the child’s] birth.”84  Perhaps even more troubling, in the 
Court’s view, was the fact that Lehr “never provided them with any 
financial support, and he . . . never offered to marry [the child’s mother].”85  
Indeed, Lehr failed to enter “his name in [New York’s putative father] 
registry,” thereby failing to observe the most minimal requirements for 
acknowledging paternity.86 
In both cases, the Court concluded that the proposed adoption could 
proceed over the biological father’s objections, and that such action did not 
violate either father’s constitutional rights.87  In rejecting the unmarried 
fathers’ claims, the Court acknowledged the fundamental nature of parental 
rights,88 but noted the limits of biology in establishing paternal rights.  In 
Quilloin, for example, the Court observed that “the Due Process Clause 
would be offended if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a 
natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without 
some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought 
to be in the children’s best interest.”89  But Quilloin, the Court reasoned, 
did not present these difficulties because Quilloin’s relationship with his 
son did not constitute a “natural family” entitled to legal protection.  
Quilloin had never sought legal custody of his son, and the proposed 
adoption did not seek to place the child with a new set of parents with 
whom the child had never lived.  Indeed, validating Quilloin’s claims 
would prompt the “breakup of a natural family,” as the challenged adoption 
by the boy’s mother and stepfather would “give full recognition to a family 
                                                          
 80. Id. (internal punctuation omitted). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). 
 83. Id. at 250. 
 84. Id. at 252. 
 85. Id. Indeed, the child’s mother married Richard Robertson eight months after 
her daughter’s birth.  Id. at 250. 
 86. See id. at 251. 
 87. Id. at 267-68; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). 
 88. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that 
the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 89. Id. (internal punctuation omitted). 
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unit already in existence.”90 
Like Quilloin, Jonathan Lehr’s biological ties also were insufficient to 
perfect his paternal claims because he failed to live up to the expectations 
of fatherhood—expectations that, in the Court’s view, were inextricably 
intertwined with the marital family.  Not only had Lehr “never supported 
and rarely seen”91 his daughter during her short life, as in Quilloin, there 
was another man who had served as a father figure, providing for the girl’s 
economic upkeep—her mother’s husband.  Richard Robertson had married 
the girl’s mother and, in the context of his role as a husband, he was also 
functioning as a de facto father.  And importantly, he wished to be vested 
with legal rights as a father by adopting the girl, an act that would 
legitimate her.92  Accordingly, recognizing Lehr and Quillion’s paternal 
rights had consequences.  Crediting the paternal claims of these itinerant 
unmarried fathers would obstruct a stepparent adoption, imperiling the 
opportunity for both children to be raised as a legitimate child of the 
marital family formed by the mother and stepfather—something that, in the 
Court’s view, was preferable to the prospect of the children’s continued 
illegitimacy.93 
At first glance, it is hard to reconcile Quilloin and Lehr with Stanley.  In 
all three cases, a biological father pressed his claim for legal recognition as 
a parent—but with strikingly different outcomes.  What unites the three 
cases is the Court’s attention to the petitioners’ performances as fathers and 
its prioritization of the marital family.  According to the Court, an 
unmarried biological father’s rights were entitled to constitutional 
protection only where the father “demonstrate[d] a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the 
rearing of his child.”94  This demonstrated commitment could be clearly 
communicated through marriage to the child’s mother.  Alternatively, 
however, this kind of commitment might be demonstrated in circumstances 
like Peter Stanley’s, where there was no formal marriage, but the parties 
functioned, for most purposes, in the manner of a marital family.95  Either 
                                                          
 90. Id. 
 91. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249.  Lehr vehemently resisted this characterization.  By his 
account, he had visited his daughter and her mother in the hospital during the mother’s 
confinement.  Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).  He further claimed that from the time 
of their discharge from the hospital, his daughter’s mother had “concealed her 
whereabouts from him,” making it difficult for him to visit his daughter regularly.  Id. 
 92. Id. at 250. 
 93. See id. at 256-57 (“The institution of marriage has played a critical role . . . in 
defining the legal entitlements of family members . . . .  [Accordingly,] state laws 
universally express an appropriate preference for the formal family.”). 
 94. Id. at 261 (internal punctuation omitted). 
 95. To be clear, of these alternatives, courts have preferred marriage, as opposed to 
marriage-like behavior. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 71, at 1252. 
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way, absent marriage’s demonstrated commitment or its proxy, the 
existence of a biological link alone did not “merit . . . constitutional 
protection,”96 especially in the face of a stepfather’s petition to legitimate 
the child through adoption. 
The Court justified its stance by noting that the “importance of the 
familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems 
from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
association, and from the role it plays in ‘promot[ing] a way of life’ 
through the instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood 
relationship.” 97  Again, the Court’s meaning was obvious—at least by 
reference to its earlier jurisprudence.  The “daily association” and “way of 
life” that the Court cited referred directly to an institution that it had 
declared “sacred” and “noble” only eighteen years earlier: marriage.98  The 
important aspects of the familial relationship that justified strong 
constitutional protections for parents’ rights were not merely incident to the 
fact of procreation.  They were bonds forged in the context of the marital 
family—or families that approximated the marital family in form or 
function.  For fathers this meant participating in the lives of their children 
by living with them and privatizing the household’s dependency by 
providing economic support—acting like a husband, as well as like a 
father.99 
But importantly, the Court’s prioritization of a particular kind of 
fatherhood was not about the desirability of marriage and the marital family 
alone.  As the Court’s disposition of another case in the unmarried fathers 
line, Caban v. Mohammed, suggests, it also was about the undesirability of 
non-marriage and its consequences, including illegitimacy. 
                                                          
 96. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming 
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, 
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 99. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 71, at 1253 (noting “[t]he close association of 
legally cognizable fatherhood with the marital family”).  The Court’s account of 
marital family fatherhood is dependent on comportment with the traditional male 
breadwinner model.  This model, however, is at odds with recent pressures for fathers 
to undertake caregiving obligations that historically have been gendered female.  
Donna St. George, Fathers Are No Longer Glued to Their Recliners; Child-Care, 
Housework Hours Increase, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2007, at A11 (showing a dramatic 
increase in time spent by men in childcare between 1965 and 2003).  The disjunction 
between the Court’s understanding of fatherhood and more recent social pressures 
warrants closer scholarly attention. 
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3.  Caban v. Mohammed 
The Court’s 1979 disposition of Caban is entirely consistent with 
Stanley, Lehr and Quilloin.  Like Quilloin and Lehr, Caban involved an 
unmarried father’s claim for paternal rights in the face of an adoption 
petition lodged by his children’s mother and stepfather.100  Importantly, 
however, Abdiel Caban prevailed where Jonathan Lehr and Leon Quilloin 
did not because he, like Peter Stanley, performed fatherhood in a way that 
was legible to the Court.  In short, Caban defied the established script for 
unmarried fathers.  He had been a consistent presence in the lives of his 
two children.  And as the Court reported, he performed fatherhood against 
the backdrop of a marriage-like relationship with Maria Mohammed, his 
children’s mother.  Caban and Mohammed “lived together,” 
“represent[ing] themselves as being husband and wife, although they never 
legally married.”101  During this time, Caban “lived with the children as 
their father,” contributing to the family’s support.102 
And interestingly, though Caban, like Quilloin and Lehr, also concerned 
an unmarried father’s objection to the adoption of his children by their 
stepfather, there was a crucial difference.  At the time he challenged the 
adoption petition, Caban himself was newly married to his wife, Nina.103  
Accordingly, crediting Caban’s paternal rights was a far easier proposition 
than had been the case in either Quilloin or Lehr.  Not only had Abdiel 
Caban performed in the manner of a married father during his children’s 
lives, at the time of his legal challenge, he was a married man capable of 
shouldering the economic and emotional burdens of a husband and father 
within the marital family. 
In crediting Caban for performing fatherhood in a manner consistent 
with the marital family, the Court also discredited non-marriage and 
illegitimacy.  Caban’s legal claims focused on the statutory distinction 
between unmarried mothers and fathers, which permitted unmarried 
mothers the opportunity to object to the adoption of their children, but did 
not allow unmarried fathers a similar opportunity.104  One of the state’s 
justifications for the distinction was its concern for “the interests of 
illegitimate children, for whom adoption often is the best course.”105  
Allowing unmarried fathers to block the adoption of their biological 
children would “have the overall effect of . . . depriving innocent children 
                                                          
 100. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). 
 101. Id.  Until 1974, Caban was married to another woman, from whom he was 
separated.  Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 383. 
 104. Id. at 386-87. 
 105. Id. at 390. 
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of the other blessings of adoption,” including ridding them of the “cruel 
and undeserved” stigma of illegitimacy.106 
The state’s emphasis on the harms of illegitimacy as a justification for 
the statutory distinction between unmarried mothers and fathers is perhaps 
unsurprising.107  But what is surprising is that, less than twenty years after 
Levy and Glona, the Court accepted unquestioningly the validity of these 
concerns,108 concluding only that they could not be served by the statute’s 
gender-based distinction.109  More striking still is the fact that both the 
majority and the dissents in Caban agreed on this point.  According to 
dissenting Justice Stewart, so great were the harms and stigma of 
illegitimacy that the state’s interest in “promoting the welfare of 
illegitimate children”110 through adoption was properly prioritized above 
the rights of unmarried fathers.111  In his dissent, Justice Stevens echoed 
these concerns.  Citing statistics on the growing incidence of 
                                                          
 106. Id. 
 107. Indeed, in other cases concerning illegitimacy, the Court would continue to 
validate these intuitions about the differences between biological maternity and 
paternity in forging the requisite bonds to children.  See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 
(2001) (upholding an immigration scheme that required unmarried fathers to undertake 
more steps to confer birthright citizenship on their children than those required for 
unmarried mothers); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1998) (same); Parham 
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (rejecting a challenge to a Georgia law that provided 
that fathers (but not mothers) of out-of-wedlock children could not inherit from their 
children unless they had legitimated them); see also Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044, 
1047-48 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a denial of certiorari on the 
ground that “the [s]tate may not ignore a mother’s unique efforts in carrying a child to 
term . . . when deciding whether she, as opposed to the father, is entitled to inherit from 
the deceased child’s estate”) (emphasis in original). 
 108. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391 (“The State’s interest in providing for the well-being of 
illegitimate children is an important one.  We do not question that the best interests of 
such children often may require their adoption into new families who will give them 
the stability of a normal, two-parent home.  Moreover, adoption will remove the stigma 
under which illegitimate children suffer.”). 
 109. Id. at 389 (“The present case demonstrates that an unwed father may have a 
relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother. . . .  We reject, 
therefore, the claim that the broad, gender-based distinction of § 111 is required by any 
universal difference between maternal and paternal relations . . . .”). 
 110. Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the children of married parents, 
illegitimate children begin life with formidable handicaps.  They typically depend upon 
the care and economic support of only one parent—usually the mother.  And, even in 
this era of changing mores, they still may face substantial obstacles simply because 
they are illegitimate.  Adoption provides perhaps the most generally available way of 
removing these handicaps.  Most significantly, it provides a means by which an 
illegitimate child can become legitimate—a fact that the Court’s opinion today barely 
acknowledges.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 111. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution does not require that an 
unmarried father’s substantive parental rights must always be coextensive with those 
afforded to the fathers of legitimate children. . . .  The decision to withhold from the 
unwed father the power to veto an adoption by the natural mother and her husband may 
well reflect a judgment that the putative father should not be able arbitrarily to withhold 
the benefit of legitimacy from his children.”). 
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illegitimacy,112 especially among urban populations,113 Stevens declared 
adoption “an important solution to the problem of illegitimacy.”114 
Taken together, Stanley, Quilloin, Lehr, and Caban all confirm law’s 
preference for the marital family—or families that closely approximate the 
marital model—over other alternatives.  And importantly, all four cases, 
whether expressly or indirectly, make clear the Court’s stance on 
illegitimacy.  Regardless of the differences in the legal outcomes for each 
petitioner, the Court affirms, in no uncertain terms, that illegitimacy is 
undesirable and harmful. 
With this in mind, the Court’s disposition of these cases is entirely 
consistent with the alternate reading of Levy and Glona advanced in Part I.  
Like Levy and Glona, none of these cases should be interpreted exclusively 
as liberalizing sexual mores and embracing childrearing outside of 
marriage.  Instead, the protection afforded unmarried fathers is, like the 
protection afforded the Levy children and Minnie Brade Glona, contingent 
and cabined.  Taken together, these cases all can be read as an endorsement 
of marriage and the marital family over non-marriage.115 
Though the unmarried fathers cases confirm my alternative reading of 
Levy and Glona, they also gesture forcefully towards something that was 
less visible in Levy and Glona.  Both Levy and Glona have come to stand 
for the proposition that, in most cases, a child should not be punished for 
the sins of his parents.116  It is this interpretation of Levy, Glona, and their 
progeny that has fueled the view that illegitimacy is largely about the 
vertical relationship between a parent and child.117 
The unmarried fathers cases, however, suggest that this view is 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 402 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  Justice Stevens further noted that adoption would confer upon “the 
thousands of children who are born out of wedlock every day” legitimate status, and 
would provide them with “opportunities that would otherwise be denied.” Id. at 402. 
 115. But no one should mistake these cases as valuing “marriage-like” families to 
the same degree as marital families.  Though Stanley and Caban vindicate the rights of 
fathers who function in the manner of married fathers, the Court is quick to note that 
the easiest—and preferred—way to perfect one’s paternal rights is to not only act like a 
married father, but to actually be married to the child’s mother.  Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (noting that traditionally, the primary measure for gauging a man’s paternal 
rights “has been the legitimate familial relationship he creates with the child by 
marriage with the mother”). 
 116. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), appeared to retreat from Levy and 
Glona by upholding a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children in 
Louisiana’s intestate succession law.  In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan excoriated 
the majority for “uphold[ing] the untenable and discredited moral prejudice of bygone 
centuries which vindictively punished not only the illegitimates’ parents, but also the 
hapless, and innocent, children.”  Id. at 541 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 117. This focus stems from the strategic decision to challenge illegitimacy laws 
from a child-centered perspective.  See Davis, supra note 6, at 98. 
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incomplete.  Though all of the unmarried fathers cases advert to the nature 
of the unmarried father’s relationship with his children, they also deal 
squarely with the nature of the relationship between the parents themselves.  
Thus, in Stanley and Caban, the petitioner’s relationship with his minor 
children is framed against the backdrop of his marriage-like relationship 
with his former partner.  In Quilloin and Lehr, the petitioners’ claims fail 
because, in the absence of a marriage-like relationship with their ex-
partners, they were unable to perform fatherhood in a manner that was 
constitutionally legible to the Court. 
These cases make clear what the illegitimacy progress narrative often 
misses.  Though the vertical parent-child relationship is an important part 
of the illegitimacy calculus, it is not the exclusive—or even the primary—
concern.  What also animates the discomfort with illegitimacy is the 
horizontal relationship between two adults who choose to have sex and 
relationship outside of marriage.118  In this way, the harm of illegitimacy is 
anchored by a persistent skepticism of non-marriage (and all of its 
consequences) and a persistent veneration of marriage as the normative 
ideal for adult intimate life. 
And it is this insight that makes the Court’s 1989 plurality decision in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.119 more easily comprehensible.120  Though the 
case is recognized as part of the Stanley line of unmarried fathers cases, it 
departs sharply from the text and tenor of its predecessor cases by 
abandoning any pretense of concern with illegitimacy and the fate of 
illegitimate children.121  Instead, a plurality of the Court focused single-
mindedly on legal protections for marriage and the marital family over non-
marital alternatives. 
4.  Michael H. v. Gerald D. 
The facts of Michael H. are fairly well known.  Carole D. was married to 
                                                          
 118. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 
UCLA L. REV. 637, 671 (1993) (noting that an unwed father’s relationship with his 
child’s mother is a crucial factor in determining paternal rights). 
 119. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 120. Some commentators have viewed the plurality’s decision in Michael H. as a 
break from the preceding unmarried fathers cases, emphasizing the plurality’s apparent 
deviation from the biology plus rule.  However, as this analysis makes clear, if viewed 
through the lens of a pro-marriage, pro-marital family impulse, the plurality’s view of 
the facts, and the resulting holding, is entirely consistent with prior precedents. 
 121. It is also worth noting that the case is not squarely about illegitimacy as a 
status.  Though there was a 98.07% probability that she was sired by her mother’s 
lover, the child in question, Victoria, was born to a married woman during the course of 
an intact marriage.  By law, she was presumed to be the legitimate child of her 
mother’s husband.  491 U.S. at 113-14.  Indeed, the plurality opinion expressly 
concluded that “Victoria is not illegitimate, and she is treated in the same manner as all 
other legitimate children.”  Id. at 131. 
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Gerald D. when she became pregnant by Michael H. following an 
extramarital affair.122  Victoria, the child of Carole and Michael’s affair, 
grew up in what the plurality dismissed as a “quasi-family,”123 being raised 
primarily by Carole with assistance from, at times, Gerald, Michael, and 
another man, Scott K.124  In time, Carole and Gerald reconciled and went 
on to have two other children within their marriage.125 
The legal challenge involved an evidentiary presumption stating that any 
child “born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither 
impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a child of the marriage.”126  Because 
the presumption had not been rebutted by blood tests within the statutorily 
prescribed two-year period or Carole’s stipulation to Michael’s paternity, 
Victoria was, by law, conclusively presumed to be Gerald’s child.  When 
the two-year period elapsed, and Carole refused to file the necessary 
stipulation rebutting the presumption, Michael filed suit seeking legal 
recognition as Victoria’s father.127  Importantly, Victoria herself was a 
party to the suit.  Represented by a guardian ad litem, she filed a cross-
complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships 
with both Michael and Gerald.128 
The plurality opinion spent little time considering Victoria’s claims,129 
and it easily rejected Michael’s claims that biology, coupled with his 
relationship with Victoria, established his paternal rights.130  In fact, the 
bulk of the plurality’s decision focused not on the parent-child relationship 
between Victoria and Michael, or Michael’s rights as a biological father, 
but on the marital relationship between Carole and Gerald. 
Though Michael, relying on the earlier unmarried fathers cases, argued 
that his liberty interest was created by “biological fatherhood plus an 
established parental relationship,”131 the plurality dismissed his 
characterization of the unmarried fathers cases as a “distort[ion].”132  
According to the Court, the thread undergirding these cases was not legal 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 113-14. 
 123. Id. at 114. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 115. 
 126. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (1967) (repealed 1994). 
 127. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115. 
 128. Id. at 114. 
 129. Id. at 130-31 (“We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a 
liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial 
relationship.  We need not do so here because, even assuming that such a right exists, 
Victoria’s claim must fail.”). 
 130. Id. at 130. 
 131. Id. at 123 (citing Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr). 
 132. Id. 
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protection for unmarried biological fathers who had forged a parental 
relationship with their illegitimate children, but rather legal protection for 
the “sanctity . . . traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop 
within the unitary family.”133  Put differently, these cases protected the 
“unitary family” from laws that swept too broadly and did not distinguish 
between those families that accorded with the values and norms of the 
marital family, and those that did not.134  And the Court made explicit that 
though the marital family typified the unitary family, it was not the 
exclusive model of unitariness.135  The family in Stanley, the Court noted, 
was “such a family,”136 despite the absence of a marriage certificate.  With 
this, the Court, more than ten years after its decision in Stanley, laid bare 
the contingent nature of its protection of paternal rights.  Stanley and 
Caban’s claims were vindicated not solely because they acted as fathers to 
their children, but also because they did so against the backdrop of an adult 
horizontal relationship that mimicked marriage in important ways. 
But if the “unitary” family included non-marital families like the 
Stanleys, the plurality was clear that the “quasi-family”137 established by 
the “extraordinary”138 facts of Michael H. did not.  Though the unitary 
family included “the household of unmarried parents and their children,”139 
it could not be “stretched so far as to include the relationship established 
between a married woman, her lover, and their child.”140  Put differently, 
Michael H. and Carole may have mimicked marriage intermittently during 
their on-again-off-again relationship, but this non-marital mimicry paled in 
comparison to—and did not supplant—an actual marriage. 
In this way, the Court presented the conflict between marriage and non-
marriage as a zero-sum game.  “[T]o provide protection to an adulterous 
natural father is to deny protection to a marital father.”141  The plurality 
clearly understood Michael’s attempt to perfect his paternal rights as a 
challenge to Gerald’s rights as a husband functioning as a father within the 
context of the marital family.142  And in such a challenge, the winner was 
                                                          
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (discussing “the historic respect—indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a 
term—traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary 
family”). 
 135. Id. at 123 n.3 (“The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, 
which we have referred to as the ‘unitary family,’ is typified, of course, by the marital 
family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children.”). 
 136. Id. at 123. 
 137. Id. at 114. 
 138. Id. at 113. 
 139. Id. at 123 n.3. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 130. 
 142. Id. at 129 (“Where, however, the child is born into an extant marital family, the 
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obvious.  When presented with an actual marriage, in which the vertical 
relationship between children and parents is likely to develop, the Court 
credited marriage and the marital family over non-marriage. 
B.  A New Illegitimacy? 
The unmarried fathers cases offer an important counterpoint to Levy and 
Glona—one that usefully complicates the inherited narrative that presents 
Levy, Glona, and their progeny as a part of the liberalization of sexual 
mores in the 1960s and 1970s.  Though the unmarried fathers cases do not 
confront squarely the validity of legal disadvantages for non-marital births, 
they are consistent with Levy and Glona in that they concern the nature and 
scope of constitutional protections for those who live and raise children 
outside of marriage’s boundaries.  And importantly, these cases clarify the 
overstated aspect of Levy and Glona’s legacy of legal progress. 
Moreover, the unmarried fathers cases make clear the degree to which 
the parent-child relationship is dependent upon—indeed, is assumed to be 
part of—the horizontal relationship between adults who are intimate 
partners.  Accordingly, these cases reveal that much of the discomfort over 
illegitimacy is rooted in the skepticism of non-marriage and a normative 
preference for marriage (and to a lesser extent, marriage-like relationships) 
as the model for adult intimate relationships. 
In this way, Levy and Glona do not represent the salad days when 
illegitimacy eclipsed its formerly disfavored status and non-marital 
children enjoyed the same status as those born within marriage, as the 
inherited narrative would have us believe.  Instead, the unmarried fathers 
cases help reveal Levy, Glona, and their progeny for what they are—a 
series of cases that offer limited protection for non-marital families, if they 
comport themselves in a particular way.  With this in mind, it is clear that 
the rumors of the “old” illegitimacy’s death have been greatly exaggerated.  
The Levy/Glona interregnum was not necessarily a more liberal era in law’s 
treatment of illegitimacy, but rather a permutation of the common law 
tradition in which marriage, the marital family, and marital birth was 
privileged and prioritized. 
With that in mind, let me return to my initial question—does the recent 
interest in illegitimacy in the context of the same-sex marriage debate 
signal the renewed salience of illegitimacy as a legal concept?  To the 
extent that the debate over same-sex marriage is, at bottom, a debate over 
how to define and enact marriage as a social and legal institution, the 
renewed interest in illegitimacy is entirely understandable.  The boundary 
                                                          
natural father’s unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of 
the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give 
categorical preference to the latter.”). 
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between legitimacy and illegitimacy is the boundary between marriage and 
non-marriage.  Taken together, Parts I and II of this Essay contend that 
even after Levy and Glona, the boundary between those who are in-laws 
(married or unmarried but comporting with marital family norms) and 
those who were outlaws (unmarried and not comporting with marital 
norms) remained intact and salient.  Accordingly, the recent interest in 
illegitimacy merely speaks to an unbroken legal legacy that favors marriage 
as the model for intimate life. 
With all of this in mind, this Essay now shifts to my second question: 
Even if the emphasis on illegitimacy is consistent with law’s preference for 
marriage and the marital family, what are the consequences of this interest 
in illegitimacy?  In answering this question, the subsequent Parts consider 
illegitimacy, racial stigma, and claims for marriage equality.  Part III first 
details the way in which illegitimacy has been deeply racialized in the 
United States.  Part IV then explains how illegitimacy has emerged as an 
issue in the marriage equality debate.  It then discusses the unintended, or 
underappreciated, costs of using illegitimacy to bolster claims for same-sex 
marriage. 
III. ILLEGITIMACY, RACE, AND STIGMA 
As the preceding Part explained, Levy and Glona do not represent a 
broad shift in law’s understanding of illegitimacy.143  Instead, both cases 
are entirely consistent with law’s persistent skepticism of non-marriage and 
its veneration of marriage and the marital family. 
Interestingly, despite the prioritization of marriage and the marital family 
evident in law and everyday life, empirical evidence suggests a wider array 
of familial models in contemporary society.144  For example, statistics show 
that the number of non-marital births has increased substantially since 
1960,145 in large part due to births to cohabiting but unmarried partners.146  
Despite these changes, the stigma of illegitimacy remains as pronounced as 
                                                          
 143. Instead, one might see these cases as emblematic of what Reva Siegel has 
termed “preservation through transformation.”  Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: 
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2184 (1996).  That is, 
they represent a shift in the way we view illegitimate children and their (lack of) 
culpability, rather than a shift in our view of their parents’ “lifestyle” and the normative 
hegemony of marriage. 
 144. Murray, The Networked Family, supra note 34, at 390-94 (discussing the 
diversity of familial forms). 
 145. Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2009, NAT’L VITAL 
STATS. REPS., Dec. 21, 2010, at 4, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_03.pdf. 
 146. Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for 
Children’s Family Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 35 (2000). 
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ever.147  The social anxiety and stigma that surrounds single mothers is 
illustrative.  For many, the paradigmatic image of single mothers is the 
young, African American woman receiving public assistance.148 
Indeed, the image of the poor, single, African American mother is so 
indelibly etched into the social consciousness—and is so stigmatized—that 
women who do not fit this profile, but are raising children outside of 
marriage, feel compelled to distance themselves from this public face of 
single motherhood.  Consider the rise of the group Single Mothers by 
Choice (SMC).149  For these women, many of whom are older, educated, 
financially secure, and white, the stigma associated with single motherhood 
is particularly unwelcome.150  Accordingly, their decision to denominate 
themselves as Single Mothers by Choice is conscious and deeply 
meaningful. 
By underscoring that they are electing to have children outside of 
marriage, they are signaling that they have the wherewithal to raise their 
children independently of the state (and a man),151 and, as importantly, that 
their choice is not the result of promiscuity or immorality,152 but rather, the 
product of a conscious, deliberate, decision-making process.153  The 
invocation of their choice to be single mothers is at once a method for 
                                                          
 147. Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm, supra note 24, at 347 (“Despite these legal and 
demographic changes, nonmarital children continue to suffer legal and social 
disadvantages as a result of their birth status.”). 
 148. See KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE 
PREGNANCY 83 (1996).  This vision of the single mother was reinforced by the 1965 
Moynihan Report, which attributed the disparity between African Americans and other 
social groups in the United States to the non-traditional “family structure of lower class 
[African Americans].”  OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (Mar. 1965) 
[hereinafter Moynihan Report], http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/webid-
meynihan.htm.  The image of the unmarried African American mother was further 
stigmatized in 1976 when presidential-hopeful Ronald Reagan introduced the term 
“welfare queen” into the lexicon.  The term referred to those accused of collecting 
excessive public assistance payments due to fraud or manipulation, but was broadly 
construed to apply to poor, African American mothers.  See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & 
MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD 
AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN 183-89 (2005). 
 149. See SINGLE MOTHERS BY CHOICE, http://www.singlemothersbychoice.org (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
 150. Jane D. Bock, Doing the Right Thing?: Single Mothers by Choice and the 
Struggle for Legitimacy, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 62, 63 (2000) (noting that these single 
mothers often “inherit the stigma of their poorer younger sisters”). 
 151. Indeed, SMCs emphasize their ability to provide a comfortable living for their 
families without enlisting the support of a man or the public.  Id. at 74-75. 
 152. Id. at 76 (noting that SMCs often go to great pains to make clear that their 
families are not the products of promiscuity or other illicit behavior, and that 
“[b]ecause they can afford to provide well for a child, their decision to parent is 
moral”). 
 153. Id. at 64 (“By appropriating the term single mother by choice . . . , midlife 
middle-class single women implicitly claim their entitlement to make this decision.”). 
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distancing themselves from the stereotypical welfare queens or teen 
mothers who lack the means to make such choices, as well as a talisman to 
shield themselves and their children from the inevitable stigma and 
judgment that accompanies child-rearing outside of the marital family.154 
But because illegitimacy involves not just the vertical relationship 
between parent and child, but also the horizontal relationship between two 
adults who elect to live outside of marriage, we should understand the 
voices of those who claim to be Single Mothers by Choice within this 
broader frame.  That is, the decision to have a child outside of marriage 
means that one is not only departing from an entrenched script about 
parenting, but that one also is defying an entrenched script that favors 
marriage as the preferred frame for, and conduit to, parenthood.  By 
choosing to parent alone, these single mothers are refusing to conform to 
both the established model of parenthood and the established model for 
adult relationships (at least for now).155  But importantly, their invocation 
of their choice to do so is meant to clarify that though they are defying 
these accepted scripts, they are not deviant—or at least not as deviant as 
their darker, younger, less affluent sisters.156  They are distinct from these 
other single mothers who also are bypassing the conventional scripts for 
married parenthood, but may do so in ways that are more consistent with 
stock intuitions about illegitimacy.157 
Importantly, the racialized stigma of illegitimacy is not just an issue for 
Single Mothers by Choice, who elect to parent alone and wish to have their 
choice credited and valued, rather than denigrated as deviant.  When 
married people live their intimate lives in ways that depart from marital 
norms, even legitimacy may seem illegitimate.  Recall the personal 
                                                          
 154. Id. (noting that the “single mother by choice” label “indicate[s] their place at 
the top of the single-parent hierarchy and implies that other single mothers do not enter 
parenthood by choice or, at least, not by a choice as responsible as their own”). 
 155. Many SMCs claim that they want to be in coupled relationships, but see no 
reason to forego having children until they find a suitable partner.  Id. at 71. 
 156. Of course, some would find their choice to parent alone—without a man—to be 
deeply deviant in that it defies accepted familial gender norms.  For example, in 1992, 
Dan Quayle attacked Murphy Brown—a television character—for her decision to bear 
and raise a child as a single mother.  Critically, Quayle’s disapproval focused on the 
fact that Brown’s decision “mock[ed] the importance of fathers.”  See Dan Quayle v. 
Murphy Brown, TIME, June 1, 1992, at 20, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/Essay/0,9171,975627,00.html. 
More recently, conservative pundit Bill O’Reilly denounced the actress Jennifer 
Aniston as “destructive to our society.”  Aniston, who played a single mother who had 
conceived via artificial insemination in the movie The Switch, stated in an interview 
that “[w]omen are realizing more and more that you don’t have to settle, they don’t 
have to fiddle with a man to have that child.”  Danny Shea, Bill O’Reilly: Jennifer 
Aniston Destructive to Our Society, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/11/bill-oreilly-jennifer-ani_n_678683.html. 
 157. Bock, supra note 150, at 64. 
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anecdote with which this Essay began.  When my friend asked me if I 
planned to assume my husband’s name upon the birth of my first child, she 
was expressing concern about how my departure from conventional marital 
(and parental) norms would be interpreted by third parties.  Her caveats 
were meant to remind me that with a different surname from my husband 
and child, I would not be performing marriage and married parenthood in a 
way that was easily legible to the world.  This departure, coupled with my 
racial identity, might lead third parties to assume that I was an unwed 
mother—stigmatized as promiscuous, dependent, unrespectable, and worse. 
My friend’s concerns were animated by the racialized and stigmatized 
status of illegitimacy, but they also were prompted by marriage’s normative 
priority in our society.  Indeed, the two are inextricably intertwined—the 
racialized stigma of illegitimacy is part and parcel of our ongoing 
veneration of marriage (and denigration of life outside of marriage), and a 
history in which African Americans were viewed as hypersexual and their 
access to marriage was often constrained.  To have a child and be 
respectable requires marriage—or, in the alternative, as the Single Mothers 
by Choice can attest, an ironclad explanation that dispels (even if it does 
not eliminate entirely) the negative associations that attend parenthood 
outside of the marital family.158 
It is against this backdrop of race, stigma, and a clear preference for 
marriage and the marital family that we should interrogate the emergence 
of illegitimacy as a core issue in the struggle to secure same-sex marriage 
rights.  Recently, some of those favoring marriage equality have hitched 
their wagons to illegitimacy (and all of the social disfavor and 
disapprobation it conjures up) in order to augment their claims that 
exclusion from civil marriage is an injury to LGBT individuals, couples, 
and families.  The following Part traces the emergence of this discursive 
move and its consequences. 
                                                          
 158. As Ralph Richard Banks notes, the stigma of single motherhood is less 
pronounced when an unmarried African American woman adopts a child, rather than 
bears one out of wedlock.  RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?: 
HOW THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 72 (2011).  
The difference, in my view, can be attributed to the long-standing effort to channel sex 
and reproduction into marriage.  Because adoption does not implicate the prospect of 
illicit, non-marital sex, it may carry less stigmatic weight.  Elizabeth Brandt, 
Cautionary Tales of Adoption: Addressing the Litigation Crisis at the Moment of 
Adoption, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 187, 198 (2005) (characterizing 
adoption as a “solution” to the stigma of illegitimacy); Marsha Garrison, Law Making 
for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 900 (2000) (suggesting that adoption is often a means of 
avoiding the stigma of illegitimacy); Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International 
Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 101, 137 (1998) (suggesting that the stigma of illegitimacy encourages 
unwed mothers to give children up for adoption). 
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IV. ILLEGITIMACY AND THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE MOVEMENT 
This Part examines the marriage equality movement’s use of illegitimacy 
as a means of bolstering claims for same-sex marriage.  To do so, it briefly 
traces the use of illegitimacy in the marriage equality debate—first by 
marriage traditionalists objecting to same-sex marriage, and later by those 
favoring marriage equality.  It then argues that the joinder of illegitimacy 
and marriage equality has important and perhaps unforeseen consequences, 
including consolidating marriage’s privileged position, exacerbating the 
racialized character of illegitimacy and gay identity, and further 
marginalizing less normative forms of kinship and belonging. 
 
A.  Illegitimacy and Responsible Procreation—Defending Opposite-Sex 
Marriage 
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,159 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the state’s opposite-sex only marriage 
laws violated the state constitution.160  In so doing, the decision paved the 
way for Massachusetts to become the first state in the union to permit 
same-sex marriage.161 
Though Goodridge is known as the decision that expanded civil 
marriage to include same-sex couples, it also has a rhetorical legacy that 
has been used to limit claims for marriage equality in other jurisdictions.162  
In a vigorous dissent to the Goodridge majority, Justice Robert Cordy 
defended the state’s opposite-sex only marriage laws as necessary to bring 
“order to the resulting procreation, and ensur[ing] a stable family structure 
in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized.”163  Including 
same-sex couples in marriage, a legislature could conclude, would have the 
unintended effect of undermining “marriage’s ability to serve [this] social 
                                                          
 159. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 160. Id. at 969. 
 161. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566-72 (Mass. 2004). 
 162. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); 
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 
932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez 
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 981 
(Wash. 2006); see also Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-
Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3-
4 (2009) (noting that Cordy’s rationale “was taken up” by a number of other state 
courts considering the constitutionality of opposite-sex only marriage laws). 
 163. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J., dissenting).  The facts of Michael H. 
advert to Cordy’s logic.  There, the child’s mother, Carole, was the ultimate 
irresponsible procreator—she was unfaithful and gave birth to a child sired by her 
adulterous lover.  Nevertheless, the child, Victoria, was considered legitimate solely 
because she was born during Carole’s marriage to her husband, Gerald.  See supra Part 
II.A.4 (discussing the facts of Michael H. v. Gerald D.). 
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purpose.”164 
Scholars have interpreted Cordy’s defense of opposite-sex marriage as 
conveying the state’s interest in a particular vision of marriage—one that is 
about transforming irresponsible procreators into responsible sexual 
citizens.165  But importantly, this process of transformation depends largely 
on transforming accidents of illegitimate birth into legitimate, marital 
births.  Thus, Cordy makes clear that responsible procreation begins with a 
single step: legitimating the child through marriage. 
Justice Cordy’s conflation of marriage, legitimacy, and responsible 
procreation was more fully elaborated in the 2006 decision Hernandez v. 
Robles.166  There, the New York Court of Appeals upheld that state’s laws 
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.167  The legislature, the Court 
reasoned, could rationally conclude that the promotion of heterosexual 
marriages would best serve the welfare of children because “[h]eterosexual 
intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children” and 
heterosexual relationships “are all too often casual or temporary.”168  
Accordingly, the legislature could find that marriage was necessary “to 
create more stability and permanence in the relationships that cause 
children to be born” and thus the state could offer “an inducement—in the 
form of marriage and its attendant benefits—to opposite-sex couples who 
make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other.”169 
As with Cordy’s Goodridge dissent, Hernandez’s vision of responsible 
procreation is one that takes a dim view of non-marital births.  According 
to the Hernandez majority, heterosexual procreation outside of marriage is 
all too often casual, meaningless, unstable, and impermanent—terms that 
align neatly with the standard account of illegitimacy.  Marriage thus 
provides a vehicle for these irresponsible heterosexual progenitors to rear 
their accidentally begotten children in a more stable, committed 
environment. 
                                                          
 164. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1002 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 165. Abrams & Brooks, supra note 162, at 10-12, 32 (discussing the “disciplining” 
aspect of marriage and noting that most individuals marry “because they think that it is 
the right thing to do if they want to have children”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex 
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
461, 495 (2007) (“The ‘responsible procreation’ rationale has been the predominant 
justification in many of the court decisions denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry.”). 
 166. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
 167. Id. at 12. 
 168. Id. at 7. 
 169. Id. 
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B.  Illegitimacy as Injury—A Call for Marriage Equality 
The responsible procreation argument has become a standard arrow in 
the quiver of those opposed to expanding civil marriage to include same-
sex couples.170  But this argument also has engendered a powerful response 
from some of those favoring marriage equality—one that has shaped the 
tenor of the debate by emphasizing illegitimacy as an injury visited on 
those denied access to civil marriage.171 
Importantly, the rejoinder to the responsible procreation argument is one 
that actually credits its logic.  That is, the marriage equality movement’s 
response does not dismantle the assumptions of marital stability and 
permanence (and non-marital instability and impermanence) on which the 
responsible procreation argument is predicated.  Instead, the response 
implicitly affirms the inherent worthiness of marriage relative to the 
alternative (non-marriage) and the goal of locating reproduction in 
marriage.  It simply insists that the benefits of marriage and marital birth be 
extended to include same-sex couples and their children. 
For example, the Goodridge majority responded directly to Justice 
Cordy’s responsible procreation argument by noting that, notwithstanding 
the “strong public policy to abolish legal distinctions between marital and 
nonmarital children,”172 the children of married couples are “the recipients 
of the special legal and economic protections obtained by civil 
marriage.”173  Accepting that “marital children reap a measure of family 
stability and economic security . . . that is largely inaccessible, or not as 
readily accessible, to nonmarital children,” the majority underscored the 
call for marriage equality by identifying illegitimacy as a collateral harm of 
                                                          
 170. See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“Because same-sex couples cannot by themselves procreate, the State could also 
reasonably decide that sanctioning same-sex marriages would do little to advance the 
State’s interest in ensuring responsible procreation within committed, long-term 
relationships.”); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
(concluding that “recognition of same-sex marriage would not further [the state’s] 
interest in heterosexual ‘responsible procreation’”); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 
963, 982-83 (Wash. 2006) (concluding that procreation is a “legitimate government 
interest justifying the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples”).  See also 
Abrams & Brooks, supra note 162, at 3-4 (discussing the way in which the responsible 
procreation argument has been deployed in other jurisdictions). 
 171. This argument, which I term the “illegitimacy as injury argument,” has 
flourished in Goodridge’s wake, but its seeds were sown much earlier—a fact that 
attests to illegitimacy’s disfavored status.  In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme 
Court emphatically articulated an interest in providing the children of same-sex couples 
with the legal privileges of legitimacy, and noted the irony of withholding marriage’s 
many privileges simply because a child’s parents were two people of the same sex.  744 
A.2d 864, 882 (Vt. 1999). 
 172. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956 (Mass. 2003). 
 173. Id. 
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excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage.174 
Other courts have been even more forthright in their view that children—
whether of opposite-sex couples or same-sex couples—should be spared 
the indignity of illegitimacy.  In her dissent from the majority opinion in 
Hernandez v. Robles, Chief Judge Judith Kaye conceded that New York 
had “a legitimate interest in the welfare of children,” but maintained that 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage “in no way 
further[ed] this interest.  In fact, it undermin[ed] it.”175  Excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage deprived their children of the many “tangible legal 
protections and economic benefits” with which marriage is associated.176  
Withholding these protections from the children of same-sex couples was 
plainly “antithetical to their welfare.”177 
For the most part, judicial rejoinders to the responsible procreation 
argument have focused on the folly of extending the protections of 
marriage to the children of opposite-sex couples, in the interest of ensuring 
a stable family structure, while precluding similar protections to children 
raised by same-sex couples.178  Perhaps because Levy and its progeny have 
stood for the proposition that the “sins of the parents” ought not be borne 
by the children,179 few courts have directly engaged the issue of the 
stigmatic costs of illegitimacy. 
But while courts have been reluctant to confront the stigmatic costs of 
illegitimacy in their decisions, advocacy groups have had few reservations 
about doing so in their briefs and arguments on behalf of marriage equality.  
In a recent complaint filed before a New Jersey trial court, Garden State 
Equality, an advocacy group for marriage equality, argued that marriage’s 
benefits were of critical importance to the children of same-sex couples, 
conferring upon them the legal and social legitimacy associated with the 
institution.180  Similarly, in its amicus brief in Conaway v. Deane, the 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 956-57.  As the Goodridge majority concluded, excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage would not necessarily ensure the security of the children born to 
opposite sex couples, but did “prevent the children of same-sex couples from enjoying 
the immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of a stable family structure 
in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized.”  Id. at 964 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 175. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 901 (Iowa 2009) (“[T]he germane 
analysis does not show how the best interests of children of gay and lesbian parents, 
who are denied an environment supported by the benefits of marriage under the statute, 
are served by the ban [on same-sex marriage].”). 
 179. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“Obviously, no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—
as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”). 
 180. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 27, Garden State Equal. v. 
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challenge to Maryland’s opposite-sex marriage requirement, the American 
Psychological Association spoke directly to the issue of stigma: “[the] 
stigma of illegitimacy will not be visited upon the children of same-sex 
couples when those couples can legally marry.”181  The American Academy 
of Matrimonial Lawyers concurred in their amicus brief in the same case: 
“[t]he only way to eliminate [the] harms [of illegitimacy] is to allow same-
sex parents to marry so children who are born within their marriage are 
automatically legitimate.”182 
The allure of the illegitimacy as injury argument is obvious given the 
degree to which children’s rights and privileges are linked to their parents’ 
status.183  But there is something worrisome about the rhetoric of 
illegitimacy invoked by marriage equality proponents.  At the heart of these 
accounts of illegitimacy as injury is a sense that the injury is patently 
unjustified.  But those who invoke the illegitimacy as injury argument are 
not concerned with the injuries borne by all children born outside of 
marriage.  The concern is reserved for the children of same-sex couples.  
For those who can marry legally, but choose not to do so, the burdens of 
illegitimacy—for themselves and their children—are the (deserved) costs 
of that (irrational) choice.  The injustice for same-sex couples is that they 
do not have a choice (at least not in most jurisdictions).  They do not 
choose to live and raise children outside of marriage—they are required to 
do so. 
In this way, illegitimacy is something that is thrust upon them and their 
children against their will.  And it is the lack of choice—the absence of 
volition—that rankles.  Implicit in the argument is a sense that if same-sex 
couples raising children could marry, they would.  They would not hobble 
their children with the taint of illegitimacy.  They would marry and they 
                                                          
Dow, No. 00000, 2011 WL 2582866, at *27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 29, 2011) 
(“Marriage is as likely to benefit the . . . children of . . . same-sex couples emotionally, 
economically, and legally as it does other children.”). 
 181. Brief of American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 43, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44), 
2006 WL 3096521, at *43.  In an amicus brief filed in Andersen v. King County, the 
challenge to Washington’s opposite-sex marriage requirement, the APA noted that 
“being born to unmarried parents is still widely considered undesirable.”  Amicus 
Curiae Brief of American Psychological Association at 48, Andersen v. King Cnty., 
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1), 2005 WL 901986, at *48. 
 182. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Gitanjali Deane & Lisa Polyak, 
et al., American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers et al. at 11, Conaway v. Deane, 932 
A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44), 2006 WL 3096523, at *11. 
 183. See Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian 
Parents: Challenging the Three Pillars of Exclusion—Legitimacy, Dual-Gender 
Parenting, and Biology, 28 LAW & INEQ. 307, 322-23 (2010) (noting that “[w]ell-
settled equal protection law mandates that a state may not invidiously discriminate 
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children 
generally,” and concluding that “[c]hildren of same-sex couples are in a similar 
position as the children in [those] cases”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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would build the stable, permanent families with which marriage is 
associated.  They are not like the opposite-sex couples that can raise their 
children in marriage, but do not.184 
The emphasis on the lack of volition—and the implicit comparison with 
those couples that do have the choice to marry but do not—also produces 
another important narrative in the marriage equality movement’s use of the 
illegitimacy as injury argument.  It is not solely that illegitimacy is 
injurious because it is unfair and unchosen; it is galling because it is 
undeserved.  Let me clarify this point by reference to another strategic 
aspect of the marriage equality campaign: the selection of plaintiffs to front 
the campaign’s litigation efforts.  As some scholars have acknowledged, 
those selected to front marriage equality lawsuits are carefully selected in 
an effort to emphasize certain traits and downplay others.185  By and large, 
the plaintiffs in these lawsuits are in “long term, committed, marriage-like 
relationships” in which they are raising children.186  The selection of these 
“model” plaintiffs is at once an effort to normalize the claim for same-sex 
marriage—to underscore that same-sex couples are just like the opposite-
                                                          
 184. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003) 
(emphasizing that “[i]ndividuals who have the choice to marry each other and 
nevertheless choose not to may properly be denied the legal benefits of marriage”). 
 185. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) [hereinafter Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex 
Marriage Politics] (discussing the selection of plaintiffs in marriage equality 
litigation); Douglas NeJaime, Note, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: 
Clarifying Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 545 (2003) (noting that the plaintiffs in Goodridge 
were selected, in part, based on their comportment with heteronormative family ideals).  
This impulse is not exclusively a strategy for marriage equality.  Gay rights litigation, 
more generally, has operated in this fashion.  See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE 
HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 80 (2006) (“[I]f we look at the gay plaintiffs 
presented to the courts and the world as the public face of gay rights, we see ‘straight-
acting’ men . . . .  We see less of Perry Watkins—an African-American army service 
member with an . . . exemplary service record who performed as the drag queen 
Simone.”); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1467, 1505-06 (2000) (describing the selection of “representatives for gay and 
lesbian victimization,” and noting that “[t]he hope was for this strategy to convey that 
real people—innocent, decent, hardworking people—people who were just like 
everybody else, were being harmed by military homophobia”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Jeffrey Schmalz, On the Front Lines With Joseph Steffan: From Midshipman 
to Gay Advocate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at C10 (Steffan, the public face of gay 
opposition to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, was an “understated, well-scrubbed 
boy next door.  No one will ever label Joe Steffan a screaming queen.”).  A similar 
strategy of emphasizing respectability was deployed by those advocating for the civil 
rights of racial minorities during the Civil Rights Movement.  See TOMIKO BROWN-
NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 32 (2011) (noting that black leaders cultivated norms of “respectability” to 
combat stereotypes justifying discrimination). 
 186. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 32-33 (2010); see also Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 
supra note 29, at 59 (discussing the selection of marriage equality plaintiffs); Franke, 
The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, supra note 185, at 239) (discussing the 
selection of “perfect plaintiffs”). 
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sex couples permitted to legalize their relationships as marriage187—and an 
attempt to amplify the injustice of their exclusion from civil marriage.188 
These couples have assumed the burdens and obligations of marriage, but 
are precluded from its many benefits.189  Similarly, the marriage equality 
campaign’s use of illegitimacy as injury challenges same-sex couples’ 
exclusion from marriage by contrasting their conformity with marriage’s 
norms of respectability and discipline with the deviance of those who could 
marry and do not. 
On this account, same-sex couples are not only more proximate to their 
opposite-sex counterparts, they are more distant from single mothers, 
deadbeat dads, and anyone who makes the “conscious” decision to bear and 
raise a child outside of marriage and its norms.190  In this way, these same-
sex couples are not only “perfect plaintiffs,”191 they are also perfect parents.  
And those who willfully depart from the marital model and bear and raise 
children out of wedlock are, by comparison, imperfect and deviant. 
C.  The Costs of the Illegitimacy as Injury Argument 
The foregoing sections described the emergence of the illegitimacy as 
injury argument in the marriage equality litigation efforts.  This move, I 
contend, is deeply troubling on a number of levels.  In the subsections that 
follow, I consider some of the costs of linking illegitimacy with claims for 
marriage equality.  These costs include the racialization of both gay rights 
advocacy and illegitimacy, the obsfucation of structural impediments that 
may stymie marriage and other forms of valued coupledom among certain 
groups, and the marginalization of other, less normative, forms of kinship 
and belonging. 
                                                          
 187. Carbado, supra note 185, at 1506 (arguing that mainstream gay advocacy 
frames same-sex couples as “‘but for’ gay people—people who, but for their sexual 
orientation, [ar]e perfectly mainstream”). 
 188. The existence of these couples also demonstrates that marriage is not necessary 
for stable, long-term relationships. 
 189. Murray, Marriage as Punishment, supra note 29, at 59 n.315. 
 190. Few interrogate the degree to which the decision to raise children as a single 
parent is truly a conscious choice.  Indeed, state policies may lead individuals to 
“choose” to structure their family lives in ways that depart from accepted norms.  For 
example, man-in-the-house welfare eligibility rules penalized women who lived with 
male partners (whether married or not) on the ground that these men were either 
providing financial assistance to the household (and thus, public assistance was 
unnecessary, or indeed, fraudulently obtained) or that they were not contributing to the 
household and therefore were not valued.  The eligibility rules reflected gendered 
assumptions of men as economic providers, rather than nurturers, and had the effect of 
encouraging the proliferation of single mother-headed households.  See Onwuachi-
Willig, supra note 28, at 1684-85.  These types of structural impediments to creating 
and sustaining the marital family are discussed in more detail infra Part IV.C.2. 
 191. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, supra note 185, at 239. 
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1.  Racializing Gay Rights Advocacy and Illegitimacy 
One perhaps unappreciated consequence of the joinder of illegitimacy 
and claims for marriage equality is the racialization of both illegitimacy 
and gay rights advocacy.  As stated earlier, the racial dimensions of 
illegitimacy and its harms were underscored in the 1960s and 1970s when 
the Moynihan Report associated the black family’s “matriarchal structure” 
with economic instability and decline,192 and Ronald Reagan famously 
invoked the image of the black “welfare queen.”193 
Despite illegitimacy’s associations with racial minorities, and with the 
black community specifically,194 non-marital births are not an exclusively 
African American phenomenon.195  A recent study published by the Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) documented the increasing incidence of non-
marital births in the United States and abroad, noting that these increases 
have occurred across all demographic groups.196  Though the pattern of 
                                                          
 192. Moynihan Report, supra note 148, ch. IV.  As Roderick Ferguson has argued, 
the Moynihan Report’s critique of the black matriarchal family structure was not solely 
a critique of non-nuclear family forms, but about pressuring blacks to assimilate to 
norms of economic productivity—a theme that has been reprised in the contemporary 
neoliberal political agenda.  See RODERICK A. FERGUSON, ABERRATIONS IN BLACK: 
TOWARD A QUEER OF COLOR CRITIQUE 119-24 (2004).  For further discussion of the 
neoliberal agenda and its promotion of the nuclear family model, see infra Part IV.C.3. 
 193. See supra note 148 (discussing the emergence of the term “welfare queen” and 
its associations with African American women). Of course, one could argue that the 
association of racial minorities with illegitimacy preceded both of these political 
moments.  See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN 
MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 70 (2009) 
(noting that during the Jim Crow era illegitimacy laws functioned as “a type of code for 
punishing blacks”); RUTH FELDSTEIN, MOTHERHOOD IN BLACK AND WHITE 2 (2000) 
(discussing extant tropes of black motherhood in the New Deal period).  In the briefs 
filed in Levy v. Louisiana, for example, lawyers arguing on behalf of Louise Levy’s 
children identified the racialized nature of illegitimacy, suggesting that the challenged 
law was an impermissible form of race discrimination subject to strict scrutiny.  Brief 
for Appellant, supra note 9, at 8-9 (noting that “statutes directed against illegitimates 
tend to fall most heavily on Negroes . . . and in some instances may have been designed 
to achieve this end”).  The Court did not take up this aspect of the petitioners’ claim in 
its decision.  See Davis, supra note 6, at 92 (noting that courts “showed little interest” 
in the relationship between race and illegitimacy); Mayeri, supra note 48 (noting that 
the Supreme Court did not address the question of whether illegitimacy laws 
functioned as racial classifications). 
 194. Joy Jones, Marriage Is for White People, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at B01 
(documenting declining marriage rates among African Americans). 
 195. Murray, The Coming White Underclass, supra note 30 (citing high rates of 
illegitimate births in both white and black women).  Indeed, in the 1970s, opponents of 
racial desegregation often cited higher “illegitimacy” rates among African Americans 
as a “contagion” that would spread to whites.  See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM 
RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 157-58 (2010). 
 196. Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in the 
United States, NCHS DATA BRIEF 1, 3 (2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf; see also Gardiner Harris, Out-of-
Wedlock Birthrates Are Soaring, U.S. Reports, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/health/13mothers.html (discussing the CDC 
report on the patterns of non-marital childbirth in the United States). 
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non-marital births was “particularly pronounced among Hispanic 
women”197 in the United States, other countries, many of which were 
largely monoracial, saw even more dramatic increases in the incidence of 
non-marital birthrates.198  In Iceland, for example, over sixty-six percent of 
children were born to unmarried mothers.199 
This is not to say that the incidence of non-marital births is not higher 
among racial minorities in the United States than among whites, but the 
broader picture is far more complex than the racialized account of 
illegitimacy would allow.  As the CDC study reported, even in the United 
States there has been a sharp uptick in non-marital births among women 
between the ages of thirty and thirty-four, suggesting that some women 
may bear and raise children outside of marriage because of concerns about 
decreasing fertility,200 rather than because of some sort of cultural malaise 
among certain racial subgroups. 
This kind of nuance is generally absent from the marriage equality 
movement’s appeal to illegitimacy as injury.  Instead, illegitimacy is 
presented as a stigmatized position that is unfairly levied upon same-sex 
parents and their children by virtue of their exclusion from civil marriage.  
It is an argument used to emphasize the injustice of the exclusion, but in so 
doing, it also serves to distance same-sex marriage claimants from the 
social deviants who could raise their children as legitimate, but do not. 
It is worth noting that although illegitimacy in the United States has a 
decidedly racialized cast, the marriage equality movement frames its claims 
in a colorblind register.  It never characterizes illegitimacy as an issue 
associated chiefly with racial minorities.  But this colorblind frame might 
also be problematic.201  The racial undertones of illegitimacy are well 
known, as are the racial dimensions of gay advocacy.202  Just as surely as 
                                                          
 197. Harris, supra note 196. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Ventura, supra note 196, at 2.  Some might read this increase as a progress 
narrative of its own—one that suggests that women now have greater employment, 
earning, and childcare options than previous generations of women enjoyed, and thus 
need not enter into dangerous or otherwise undesirable marriages because of fears of 
economic vulnerability.  They now have sufficient resources to go it alone. 
 201. See generally Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 985 (2007) (discussing the 
perils of colorblindness). 
 202. See Allan Bérubé, How Gay Stays White and What Kind of White It Stays, in 
THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF WHITENESS 234, 236 (Birgit Brander Rasmussen et al. 
eds., 2001) (noting the discrepancy between the racial demographics of the population 
of gay men and the whiteness of the out gay men who purport to represent the larger 
group); Carbado, supra note 185, at 1499 (arguing that mainstream LGBT groups 
employ interracial analogies and construct icons of victimization that “convey[] the 
idea that to be black is to be heterosexual; to be homosexual is to be white”); Kaaryn 
Gustafson, Breaking Vows: Marriage Promotion, the New Patriarchy, and the Retreat 
39
Murray: What's So New about the New Illegitimacy
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
426 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
illegitimacy has been associated with poor African Americans, LGBT 
rights have been associated with affluent whites.203 
In linking the claim for marriage with illegitimacy, without 
acknowledging the myriad ways that illegitimacy has been raced and 
classed, the marriage equality movement distances itself from this 
marginalized other and her obvious deviance from acceptable family 
norms.  This move mirrors what some scholars have identified as an effort 
by the mainstream LGBT rights movement to ignore, obscure, or diminish 
the voices of the racial minorities within its constituency.  Russell 
Robinson and Devon Carbado’s critique of the mainstream LGBT rights 
movement’s response to Proposition 8 is illustrative.204  In the wake of 
Proposition 8’s enactment in California, some mainstream gay rights 
advocates, like Andrew Sullivan and Dan Savage, roundly denounced the 
African American community as a crucial factor in the ballot initiative’s 
success.205  The Advocate, a mainstream gay rights publication, crowed in a 
headline: Gay is the New Black,206 suggesting the irony of a civil rights 
                                                          
From Egalitarianism, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 269, 276 (2009) (discussing the 
association of illegitimacy with the African American community). 
 203. See Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodified: Speculation on Law’s Discourse, 
Race, and the Construction of Sexual Identity, in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY 
MEN AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 46-73 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin eds., 1995) 
(arguing that homosexuality is coded as “white” in judicial opinions); Russell K. 
Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (2009) [hereinafter 
Robinson, Racing the Closet] (describing the way in which “white gay men have 
dominated public images of gay men”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Beyond Bullying: 
Race, Poverty, and LGBT Rights, DISSENTING JUSTICE (Mar. 28, 2011, 10:52 AM), 
http://dissentingjustice.blogspot.com/2011/03/beyond-bullying-race-poverty-and-
lgbt.html (“According to the legend, the average LGBT person is white, wealthy and 
highly educated.”).  But see M.V. LEE BADGETT, INCOME INFLATION: THE MYTH OF 
AFFLUENCE AMONG GAY, LESBIAN, AND BISEXUAL AMERICANS 4 (1998), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/IncomeInflationMyth.pdf 
(debunking the perception of gay affluence). 
 204. Devon Carbado & Russell Robinson, What’s Wrong With Gay Rights? 
(unpublished draft) (on file with author). 
 205. Andrew Sullivan, Prop 8 Exit Polls, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2008, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2008/11/prop-8-exit-polls/209015 
(“Every ethnic group supported marriage equality, except African-Americans, who 
voted overwhelmingly against extending to gay people the civil rights once denied 
them . . . .”); Dan Savage, Black Homophobia, THE STRANGER (Nov. 5, 2008, 9:55 
AM), http://slog.thestranger.com/2008/11/black_homophobia (“Seventy percent of 
African American voters approved Prop 8, according to exit polls . . . .”).  It should be 
noted that the exit polling data suggesting that the minority vote was determinative in 
Proposition 8’s success has since been refuted.  See John Wildermuth, Black Support 
for Prop. 8 Called an Exaggeration, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 2009, at B1 (citing studies 
that show that “[p]arty identification, age, religiosity and political views had much 
bigger effects than race, gender or having gay and lesbian family and friends”); 
PATRICK J. EGAN & KENNETH SHERILL, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, 
CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 8: WHAT HAPPENED, AND WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
11 (2008), http://hunterforjustice.typepad.com/files/egan_sherrill_prop8_1_6_09.pdf 
(explaining that support for Proposition 8 can be attributed largely to religiosity, rather 
than race). 
 206. Michael Joseph Gross, Gay Is the New Black, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 16, 2008, 
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crusade thwarted by African Americans. 
The scapegoating of the African American community was troubling for 
many reasons.  First, Proposition 8’s success was based largely on an 
appeal to individual rights, like parental autonomy and religious freedom, 
rather than rampant homophobia among African Americans.207  Second, as 
Carbado and Robinson note, the decision to blame African Americans for 
Proposition 8’s success fails to register the position of those LGBT 
individuals who are also racial minorities.208  This failure, Carbado and 
Robinson maintain, is not a new phenomenon within the LGBT rights 
movement.  The movement, they argue, is often inattentive to the needs and 
desires of racial minorities within its broader constituency, which 
contributes to the perception of the LGBT rights movement as a movement 
for privileged whites.209 
The marriage equality movement’s appeal to illegitimacy echoes this 
long-standing inattention to issues of race, intersectionality, and coalition-
building within the mainstream LGBT rights movement.210  The notion of 
illegitimacy as an injury associated with racial minorities who can get 
married but do not, further marginalizes racial minorities within the LGBT 
rights movement.  It disassociates the LGBT rights movement from those 
most closely associated with illegitimacy—African Americans.  In so 
doing, the illegitimacy as injury argument helps construct a portrait of gay 
life in which those who are both sexual minorities and racial minorities are 
rendered liminal, while highlighting the distinction between respectable 
gay couples and those who willfully live and raise children outside of 
marriage. 
                                                          
http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2008/11/16/Gay_is_the_New_Black_/. 
 207. See Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Marriage, the 
State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 359 (2009) [hereinafter Murray, 
Marriage Rights and Parental Rights] (explaining how the Yes on 8 campaign 
successfully reframed its appeal to focus on individual rights and parental autonomy); 
see also Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1321 fig.1 (2010) (suggesting that support for Proposition 8 
increased after a media campaign emphasizing the effect of legal recognition of same-
sex marriage on public education, religious freedom, and parental authority over 
children). 
 208. Carbado & Robinson, supra note 204. 
 209. Id.; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for Gay Whites?: Race, 
Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1372 
(2000) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Gay Rights] (noting the exclusion of “persons of color 
and the poor from pro-gay and lesbian equality discourse,” and the concomitant 
“construction of the gay and lesbian community as white and economically 
privileged”). 
 210. See generally Hutchinson, Gay Rights, supra note 209, at 1368-72 (discussing 
the racial character of the LGBT rights movement); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: 
Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 867-68 (2008) (discussing the “operation of white racism and 
privilege within the LGBT rights movement”). 
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2.  Obscuring Structural Impediments to Marriage 
Not only does the joinder of illegitimacy with same-sex marriage claims 
further entrench the racialized notions of illegitimacy and gay life, it also 
insists upon the inevitability and availability of marriage for all who are 
eligible for the institution.  On this account, the decision to live outside of 
marriage seems particularly unorthodox, and indeed, deviant.  To wit, there 
is little critical reflection on the many reasons individuals—whether gay or 
straight—might choose not to marry; nor is there consideration of the 
structural impediments that might limit the opportunities for, and the 
desirability of, marriage for some. 
But these concerns warrant greater attention, particularly in view of the 
way that illegitimacy has been raced and classed.  Russell Robinson’s work 
is instructive on this point.  As Robinson notes, “[l]aw and social norms 
create structures that channel and limit” romantic and sexual 
opportunities.211  These structural impediments include a range of socio-
legal structures such as the prison system and patterns of residential 
segregation, as well as cultural and aesthetic preferences.212  Though these 
structural impediments are diverse, they all may impact each individual’s 
social environments, and in doing so, “determine[], in part, the romantic 
possibilities and inclinations we imagine, express, and pursue.”213 
Attention to these structural impediments provides a more nuanced lens 
through which to consider illegitimacy and the decision to live an intimate 
life outside of marriage.  Consider the association of illegitimacy with 
African American women.  Though it is true that marriage rates of African 
Americans are the lowest of any racial subgroup in the United States,214 this 
empirical portrait alone does little to identify the many factors that 
contribute to this phenomenon.  Some African American women do not 
wish to marry, but according to empirical and anecdotal evidence, some do.  
Those who wish to marry may be limited in doing so by a dearth of suitable 
                                                          
 211. Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2787, 2788 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Structural Dimensions]. 
 212. Robinson, Racing the Closet, supra note 203, at 1496, 1502-04 (describing 
various structural impediments that limit the romantic possibilities of African 
Americans).  In addition to the structural impediments identified by these scholars, we 
should also consider the economic and social inequalities that racial minorities face as 
structures that shape romantic preferences and opportunities.  Id. at 1502.  For example, 
in an effort to deal with discrimination in the workplace, racial minorities may prefer a 
romantic partner who is also a racial minority and likely to identify with these 
concerns.  See Allison Samuels, Time To Tell It Like It Is, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 2003, at 
52-55. 
 213. Robinson, Structural Dimensions, supra note 211, at 2788. 
 214. Jones, supra note 194 (reporting that “[t]he marriage rate for African 
Americans has been dropping since the 1960s, and today [African Americans] have the 
lowest marriage rate of any racial group in the United States”). 
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partners, or by other concerns.215 
These concerns speak directly to Robinson’s discussion of socio-legal 
structures.216  For many African American women, the legacy of slavery, 
coupled with continued discrimination in the workplace and other aspects 
of public life, militates in favor of intraracial marriage and against 
outmarriage.217  For these women, residential segregation, the staggering 
rate of incarceration and ongoing supervision by the criminal justice 
system, and differing rates of educational and employment achievement, 
may sharply limit the number of African American men who are 
considered eligible and available for marriage.218  For those who identify as 
gay or bisexual, the burden of being both a racial and a sexual minority, as 
well as limited legal recognition of same-sex couplings, may delay the 
decision to come out publicly, further limiting one’s options for romantic 
partners.219 
Marriage’s norms of financial interdependence with a partner and 
financial independence from the state may also explain lower marriage 
rates among African Americans (and other groups).  Married couples are 
expected to provide for each other, privatizing the dependence of their 
family unit.220  Indeed, the recent effort to promote marriage among those 
                                                          
 215. Kathryn Edin, What Do Low-Income Single Mothers Say About Marriage?, 47 
SOC. PROB. 112, 113 (2000); Jones, supra note 194 (“My observation is that black 
women in their twenties and early thirties want to marry and commit at a time when 
black men their age are more likely to enjoy playing the field.  As the woman realizes 
that a good marriage may not be as possible or sustainable as she would like, her focus 
turns to having a baby, or possibly improving her job status, perhaps by returning to 
school or investing more energy in her career.”). 
 216. Robinson, Racing the Closet, supra note 203, at 1503-04 (purporting that a 
range of structural impediments—from the mass incarceration of African American 
men to the higher educational achievement rates of African American women—help 
explain low marriage rates among the African American community); see also Dorothy 
E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004) (noting that “nearly one-third of 
black men in their twenties are under the supervision of the criminal justice system”). 
 217. See RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE & 
ROMANCE 6, 103 (2001) (reporting that more than 93% of African Americans marry 
intraracially); BANKS, supra note 158, at 122 (discussing low rates of interracial 
marriage among African American women); R. Richard Banks & Su Jin Gatlin, 
African American Intimacy: The Racial Gap in Marriage, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 115, 
130 (2005) (reporting that, of all racial minority groups, African American women are 
the least likely to marry interracially). 
 218. Robinson, Racing the Closet, supra note 203, at 1502. 
 219. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and 
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 603-10 (1997) 
(charting how the “coming out” process stressed by the majoritarian gay and lesbian 
community disparately impacts homosexuals of color because of their race and class); 
William R. Macklin, Black Gays Say Race Often Outweighs Orientation, PHIL. 
INQUIRER, Feb. 25, 1998, at D1 (noting that homosexuals of color do not experience the 
same sense of freedom from the coming out process as gay, white males). 
 220. Murray, Marriage as Punishment, supra note 29, at 45. 
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receiving public assistance explicitly articulated this claim—marriage 
would allow poor men and women to pool their resources to meet their 
needs, freeing them from dependence on the public fisc.221  However, for 
many racial minorities, these outsized expectations can be difficult to meet.  
Uneven employment prospects, a persistent wage gap relative to other 
groups, and continued discrimination in and outside of the workplace may 
make compliance with these familial norms elusive, if not impossible.222 
All of this affects romantic options and choices.  For those African 
American women and men who achieve financial success, marriage to a 
partner who is not similarly situated can be seen as undesirable or even 
risky to one’s long-term financial prospects.223  Accordingly, instead of 
waiting for suitable partners to materialize, some individuals may choose to 
have relationships and raise children outside of marriage and its 
expectations.224 
Attention to these structural elements of romantic and sexual decision-
making often is missing from the marriage equality debate. And the 
consequences of this inattention are enormous.  Constructing marriage as a 
choice that should be exercised if one is eligible renders invisible the 
constraints that make marriage a practical impossibility for the poor and 
working class, even if it is legally possible.  And perversely, the economic 
misfortunes of this underclass are blamed on their “choice” to forego 
marriage, when in fact their economic marginality may precede the 
decision to forego marriage. 
Instead of recognizing the considerable impediments to marriage that 
some individuals and groups may face, raising children outside of marriage 
is framed as either the product of an impermissible injustice that 
stigmatizes and demeans otherwise worthy families, or an unorthodox 
decision that signals one’s deviance from accepted familial norms.  At no 
point are illegitimacy and life outside of marriage presented as a rational 
means of dealing with the structural impediments that make adherence to 
traditional family norms elusive or even undesirable. 
                                                          
 221. Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights, supra note 207, at 404 (noting 
that the marriage promotion initiatives were “offered as an effective way to privatize 
economic dependency, eliminating the need for public support and intervention”); 
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 28, at 1648 (discussing Congress’s “imposition of a 
marital solution to poverty”). 
 222. BANKS, supra note 158, at 41-44; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 28, at 1683. 
 223. Edin, supra note 215, at 121. 
 224. Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 848, 855 (2004) (discussing the transformation in the meaning of 
marriage, especially for lower-income individuals for whom marriage is “a much 
sought-after but elusive goal”); see also KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES 
I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 112 (2005) 
(showing that poor people believe “it is vitally important that both [women] and their 
male partners be economically set prior to marriage”). 
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3.  Entrenching the “Private” Family and Obscuring the “Queer” Family 
Of course, there are those for whom structural impediments and other 
obstacles to marriage are of no consequence.  For these individuals, the 
decision to avoid marriage is not due to a lack of options or financial 
constraints, but due to disinterest in the institution as a conduit to family 
formation.  These individuals might be seen as pioneers in an effort to 
“queer” the family by embracing a wider array of family forms.  The 
linking of illegitimacy with claims for marriage equality obscures these 
individuals and their efforts to broaden our understanding of “family.”  The 
illegitimacy as injury argument accepts without challenging the neoliberal 
project of consigning responsibility for vulnerable individuals to the private 
sphere and the family.225  In so doing, it further entrenches the normative 
primacy of the marital family and stymies efforts to think broadly about 
more pluralistic modes of kinship and belonging and more robust state 
support for caregiving. 
As a number of scholars have noted, the neoliberal political project has, 
since the 1960s (but with greater fervor since the 1980s), focused on 
dismantling the social safety net erected in the wake of the New Deal and 
the Great Society.226  As an alternative to this system of public support, the 
neoliberal agenda has advocated a politics that emphasizes public 
deregulation, the assumption of private responsibility, and the family as a 
core site for the privatization of dependency.227 
These political developments might, at first blush, seem wholly at odds 
with the marriage equality movement.228  After all, the neoliberal agenda 
has been endorsed by groups that are apparently hostile to the prospect of 
gay civil rights, and certainly to same-sex marriage.229  But interestingly, 
there are strong points of alignment between the neoliberal project and 
those who favor extending civil marriage to include same-sex couples.230  
                                                          
 225. This neoliberal agenda is represented by projects like the Family Leader’s THE 
MARRIAGE VOW—A DECLARATION OF DEPENDENCE UPON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY.  
See supra pp. 388-89. 
 226. Angela Harris et al., From “The Art of War” to “Being Peace”: Mindfulness 
and Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2073, 2088-89 
(2007). 
 227. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005); Angela P. 
Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1541-42 (2006). 
 228. Gustafson, supra note 202, at 297-98. 
 229. Id. at 298 (noting that those who favor marriage promotion efforts as a cure for 
social ills are “staunchly opposed to same sex marriage”). 
 230. LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL 
POLITICS, AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 50 (2003) (recognizing the privatizing 
impulses that characterize both neoliberalism and the mainstream LGBT rights 
movement); DAVID L. ENG, THE FEELING OF KINSHIP: QUEER LIBERALISM AND THE 
RACIALIZATION OF INTIMACY 26-31 (2010) (noting the emphasis on privatization, 
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The marriage equality movement’s invocation of illegitimacy as injury is 
one such point of alignment, emphasizing the degree to which this facet of 
the LGBT rights movement has, perhaps unintentionally, signed on to the 
neoliberal vision of the private family. 
Though marriage equality advocates maintain that their aims are discrete 
and self-contained, and may in fact have the subversive effect of rendering 
marriage more egalitarian and progressive,231 critical aspects of their 
project accord with the neoliberal vision of the private (and privatized) 
family.  As previously discussed, in recent years, the marriage equality 
campaign has focused on portraying the “sameness” of same-sex couples 
relative to their opposite-sex counterparts.232  From the selection of 
plaintiffs to the arguments advanced in briefs and in the media, the gay 
rights position on same-sex marriage is framed as a question of equal civil 
rights—treating likes (that is, respectable, normal, monogamous, child-
rearing families) alike, whether straight or gay.233  The campaign’s strategy 
admits no acknowledgement—much less embrace—of difference or queer 
life.  The bathhouse is again closeted, along with the drag queens, leather-
folk, and other denizens of the queer demimonde.  Instead, marriage 
equality underwrites a commitment to the neoliberal values of normalcy, 
personal responsibility, and domesticity that undergird marriage and the 
marital family. 
                                                          
personal responsibility, and respectability in neoliberalism and queer liberalism). 
 231. Jyl Josephson, Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage, and Feminist Critiques of 
Marriage, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 269, 276 (2005) (suggesting that the advent of same-sex 
marriage might force people to question “the necessity of a gendered division of labor 
in marriage”); Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, 
in FAMILIES IN THE U.S.: KINSHIP AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 475, 479 (Karen V. Hansen 
& Anita Ilta Garey eds., 1998) (“Extending the right to marry to gay people . . . can be 
one of the means . . . through which the institution [of marriage] divests itself of the 
sexist trappings of the past.”).  But see Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask 
for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal 
Structure of Gender in Every Marriage”, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993) [hereinafter 
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For] (arguing that same-sex marriage will not 
effectively alter the gendered nature of traditional marriage). 
 232. Courtney Megan Cahill, Disgust and the Problematic Politics of Similarity, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 943, 950 (2011) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO 
HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010)) (“Legal advocacy 
for marriage equality has overwhelmingly relied on a litigation strategy that posits that 
the state violates constitutional liberty and equality norms when it denies same-sex 
couples the right to marry because those couples are similarly situated in nearly every 
respect to their cross-sex counterparts.”); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 
54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1366 (2005) (discussing the “like-straight” arguments that have 
been deployed in marriage-equality advocacy); see also Catherine Smith, Queer as 
Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 382 (discussing the same-sex marriage 
movement’s efforts to analogize discrimination against LGBT individuals to racial 
discrimination). 
 233. This is not an unreasonable litigation strategy.  See Elizabeth Glazer, Sexual 
Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).  However, as I discuss, this strategy 
has costs.  See supra pp. 423-35. 
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For example, an implicit assumption of the campaign and its strategy is 
the uncritical acceptance of marriage as the de facto social safety net 
through which the needs of vulnerable individuals are accommodated.234  
There is no effort to think critically about the state’s role in providing for 
the vulnerable beyond the conferral of legal recognition upon adult couples 
(and the panoply of public and private benefits that such recognition 
brings).  More problematically, the illegitimacy as injury argument not only 
juxtaposes the respectability of the litigation’s “perfect” plaintiffs against 
those who willfully deviate from the marital family form, it immediately 
conjures up the dangers of unstable, insecure families who likely will be 
required to enlist the state’s assistance to accommodate their dependency. 
Further, the movement’s invocation of illegitimacy is concerning in that 
it marginalizes attempts to render legible as “families” kinship structures 
that depart from the nuclear marital family.  For those families that exist 
outside of marriage, there may be a plurality of kinship structures and 
forms that are deployed—single parent-headed families, families that 
include or rely upon extended families or fictive kin, urban “tribes” of 
friends, and polyamorous groups, to name a few.235  Because the joinder of 
marriage equality and illegitimacy underscores the “normalcy” of those 
seeking marriage rights while simultaneously distancing them from the 
deviant families who have willfully elected to live outside of marriage, 
opportunities to imagine and validate alternative kinship structures are lost. 
This loss is at once ironic and deeply problematic.  It is ironic because in 
the early days of the LGBT rights movement, there was a strong impulse to 
develop alternative family forms and structures.236  In the 1980s, for 
example, “lesbians and gay men . . . began to speak widely of chosen 
families, the families they saw themselves creating as adults.”237  The 
emphasis on chosen families was a response to the fact that LGBT 
individuals were “ideologically excluded” from the traditional 
understanding of family, which was “by definition, heterosexual.”238  
Marginalized and disfavored, LGBT individuals focused on “queering” the 
                                                          
 234. The marriage equality movement’s routine invocation of the many public 
benefits with which marriage is associated illustrates this impulse. 
 235. Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 18-19 
(2005). 
 236. David L. Eng, Freedom and the Racialization of Intimacy: Lawrence v. Texas 
and the Emergence of Queer Liberalism, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LGBT/Q 
STUDIES 41 (George Haggerty & Molly McGarry eds., 2007); Sonia K. Katyal, The 
Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1418 (2010). 
 237. Kath Weston, Families in Queer States: The Rule of Law and the Politics of 
Recognition, 93 RADICAL HIST. REV. 122, 130 (2005); see also Gustafson, supra note 
202, at 300 (“LGBT families have commonly constructed families that transgress and 
transform notions of family.”). 
 238. Weston, supra note 237, at 130. 
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family—creating meaningful alternatives to the traditional families from 
which they were legally excluded. 
This account of “queering” the family likely will resonate with those 
familiar with the history of American slavery.  Legally barred from 
marriage and precluded by the rigors of slavery from creating enduring 
family bonds, the African American community developed a range of non-
traditional family structures.239  Vestigial aspects of these structures persist 
in the modern African American community’s reliance on caregiving by 
extended family and fictive kin, and practices like “other-mothering.”240 
I raise these historical antecedents to demonstrate the problematic aspect 
of the LGBT rights movement’s “uncritical solicitude”241 of marriage and 
the marital family.  The turn towards marriage is strongly assimilative, and 
as I have discussed, requires emphasizing the degree to which those 
seeking marriage equality are normal, respectable, and worthy.242  But it 
also requires positioning those outside of marriage and the traditional 
marital family as deviant and unworthy.243  In this way, the marriage 
equality movement’s embrace of the illegitimacy as injury argument 
permits the continued consolidation and entrenchment of the marital 
nuclear family as self-evidently worthwhile and valuable, and the 
denigration of family forms that depart from the marital model.244 
                                                          
 239. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of 
African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 256 (1999). 
 240. Murray, The Networked Family, supra note 34, at 392 (discussing these 
structures); see also Kessler, supra note 235, at 18-19 (describing alternative 
caregiving structures); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 28, at 1690 (noting that “for many 
Blacks and Latinos ‘family’ extends beyond the traditional nuclear-family model of 
mother, father, and children”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
209, 269 (1995) (noting that “Blacks’ incorporation of extended kin and nonkin 
relationships into the notion of ‘family’ goes back at least to slavery”). 
 241. Spindelman, supra note 232, at 1375. 
 242. See supra Part IV.B. 
 243. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE 
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 82 (1999) (arguing that same-sex marriage further entrenches 
marriage’s normative priority, marginalizing those outside of marriage); Franke, 
Domesticated Liberty, supra note 52, at 1414 (arguing that the push for same-sex 
marriage rights has “created a path dependency that privileges privatized and 
domesticated rights and legal liabilities, while rendering less viable projects that 
advance nonnormative notions of kinship, intimacy, and sexuality”); Polikoff, We Will 
Get What We Ask For, supra note 231, at 1546 (considering the consequences of 
“valuing one form of human relationship above all others”). 
 244. Gustafson, supra note 202, at 300 (“Still, much of the LGBT rights movement 
has been focused on marriage in the last few years, reinforcing rather than re-
envisioning notions of family.”).  Importantly, the fixation on marriage and the marital 
family that undergirds the marriage equality movement is less present in other gay 
rights advocacy initiatives.  In other venues—cases involving artificial reproductive 
technology and the rights of non-biological co-parents, for example—gay rights 
advocates often decouple parenthood from marriage in an effort to honor “chosen” 
LGBT families.  See GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES AND DEFENDERS, PROTECTING 
FAMILIES: STANDARDS FOR CHILD CUSTODY IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS (1999), 
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But more importantly, the denigration of non-normative family forms is 
especially concerning because it indicates a lost opportunity for building 
strong coalitions between the LGBT rights movement and those who 
historically have been marginalized, whether because of gender, race, 
ethnicity, or sexual orientation.245  As history attests, racial minorities and 
sexual minorities have, at one time or another, been denied legal 
recognition as families.  The danger of the marriage equality movement’s 
uncritical embrace of the illegitimacy as injury argument is that it implicitly 
endorses the marginalization of outlaw families, even as it fights for the 
right to be in-laws. 
To be clear, this critique of the marriage equality movement’s use of 
illegitimacy (and its other strategic choices) is not intended to signal my 
disagreement with the underlying issue regarding the scope and nature of 
the right to marry.  Let me be clear about this.  I support marriage equality 
and favor the expansion of civil marriage to include same-sex couples.  But 
I would also favor greater support for all families, however constituted.246 
Accordingly, I am troubled by the increasing prominence of the 
illegitimacy as injury argument in the marriage equality effort and what it 
portends for families, whether marital or not.  This Essay is an attempt to 
ventilate these concerns—to suggest that perhaps the marriage equality 
movement’s effort to render legible the injury of illegitimacy that is 
wrought by the exclusion of gays and lesbians from civil marriage has 
injurious consequences of its own. 
CONCLUSION—THE (REAL) NEW ILLEGITIMACY 
This Essay began by challenging the idea of a “new illegitimacy.”  As 
the doctrinal analyses presented make clear, the narrative that proceeds 
from the common law’s strong disfavor of illegitimacy to a more 
                                                          
available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/protecting-families.pdf. 
 245. Cathy J. Cohen, Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical 
Potential of Queer Politics?, 3 J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 437, 457 (1997) (“[O]ne of the 
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and normalizing power.”); Kate Kendell, Race, Same-Sex Marriage, and White 
Privilege: The Problem with Civil Rights Analogies, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 
137 (2005) (“Linkages and alliances are essential to the liberation of all queers.”).  For 
a thoughtful discussion of other lost opportunities for LGBT rights coalition-building, 
see Kathryn R. Abrams, Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and 
Sexuality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (2010). 
 246. I am not alone in this call for action.  See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE 
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 228-36 (1995) (calling for a shift in support from the marital family to the 
“caregiving dyad”); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (calling for greater support for 
families, whether married or not). 
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liberalized period ushered in by Levy and Glona is far less progressive than 
has been perceived.  In fact, Levy and Glona did not herald an uncritical 
acceptance of illegitimacy, but rather offered limited protections for those 
whose non-marital lives were more proximate to marital family norms and 
ideals.  With this in mind, the marriage equality movement’s appeal to the 
illegitimacy as injury argument is merely an outgrowth of the prioritization 
of marriage over non-marriage. 
But perhaps there is a new(ish) illegitimacy afoot.  It is not illegitimacy 
in the traditional sense—a definition that encompasses non-marital birth 
status.  Instead, this new(ish) illegitimacy focuses more broadly on valuing 
certain choices, while marginalizing—if not demonizing—others.  The new 
illegitimacy is rooted in neoliberalism, marriage, and the family structures 
this myopic set of political commitments engenders and privileges.  It 
credits and values marriage and the marital family above all other family 
structures, and it gauges the value of non-marital family structures with 
regard to their proximity to, or distance from, marriage.  And in doing so, 
this new illegitimacy precludes a nuanced critique of marriage and the 
racialized dimensions of illegitimacy and non-marriage, obscures the 
structural challenges that make marriage elusive or undesirable for many, 
and stymies the acceptance and proliferation of alternative family 
structures.  
This is not to say that marriage and the marital family are not valued or 
valuable.  It is to say that these structures need not be the only means by 
which we bind ourselves to those we care about and love.  In linking 
illegitimacy to the ongoing struggle for marriage equality, LGBT rights 
advocates have tapped into a powerful rhetorical tool that clearly identifies 
the legal and social injuries that historically have befallen those outside of 
marriage’s borders.  But making this link has under-appreciated costs.  In 
figuring illegitimacy as a traumatic injury, the argument consolidates 
marriage’s privileged position as the normative ideal for intimate life.  In 
doing so, it compounds the indignities and injuries faced by those who dare 
to live beyond marriage’s borders. 
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